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MUSIC AS A MATTER OF LAW
Joseph P. Fishman*
What is a musical work? Philosophers debate it, but for judges the answer has long been
simple: music means melody. Though few recognize it today, that answer goes all the way
back to the birth of music copyright litigation in the nineteenth century. Courts adopted
the era's dominant aesthetic view identifying melody as the site of originality and,
consequently, the litmus test for similarity. Surprisingly, music's single-element test has
persisted as an anomaly within the modern copyright system, where multiple features of
eligible subject matter typically are eligible for protection.
Yet things are now changing. Recent judicial decisions are beginning to break down the
old definitional wall around melody, looking elsewhere within the work to find protected
expression. Many have called this increasing scope problematic. This Article agrees -
but not for the reason that most people think. The problem is not, as is commonly alleged,
that these decisions are unfaithful to bedrock copyright doctrine. A closer inspection
reveals that, if anything, they are in fact more faithful than their predecessors. The
problem is instead that the bedrock doctrine itself is flawed. Copyright law, unlike patent
law, has never shown any interest in trying to increase the predictability of its
infringement test, leaving second comers to speculate as to what might or might not be
allowed. But the history of music copyright offers a valuable look at a path not taken, an
accidental experiment where predictability was unwittingly achieved by consistently
emphasizing a single element out of a multi-element work. As a factual matter, the notion
that melody is the primary locus of music's value is a fiction. As a policy matter, however,
that fiction has turned out to be useful. While its original, culturally myopic rationale
should be discarded, music's unidimensional test still offers underappreciated advantages
over the "everything counts" analysis that the rest of the copyright system long ago chose.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. For helpful comments and conversations,
I thank Funmi Arewa, Stephanie Bair, Shyam Balganesh, Oren Bracha, Chris Buccafusco, Charles
Cronin, Kristelia Garcia, Daniel Gervais, Paul Goldstein, Peter Menell, Joe Miller, Sean O'Connor,
Emily Richmond, Chris Serkin, Christian Turner, Rebecca Tushnet, and Emily Zazulia, as well as
participants in the BYU Intellectual Property Colloquium, the Sixteenth Annual Intellectual Prop-
erty Scholars Conference, the Junior Scholars in Intellectual Property Workshop at Michigan State
University College of Law, the Stanford/Harvard/Yale Junior Faculty Forum, the Vanderbilt Intel-
lectual Property Scholars Roundtable, and the Vanderbilt Summer Brown Bag Colloquium Series.
I'm also grateful to Andrea Alexander and the Vanderbilt Law Library for tracking down some
rather exotic requests. Any wrong notes are my own.
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MUSIC AS A MATTER OF LAW
INTRODUCTION
Any disinterested judge will have to admit that melody is, after all,
the soul of music.
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 17651
W hat is a musical work? The question may seem metaphysical.But so long as music remains a subject of copyright protection,
law needs to answer it. Our copyright system tasks courts with figuring
out how much similarity between two compositions is too much, or
where the composition stops and the performer's interpretation of it be-
gins. To fulfill that responsibility, one needs a theory for defining the
musical work at the outset.
For much of U.S. history, law collapsed the answer into a single ele-
ment: melody.2 Courts traditionally deemed melody (that is, the series
of tones of particular durations that you might offer if asked to hum a
few bars3 ) to be "the finger prints of the composition" that "establish its
identity."4 That definition places melodic likeness at the center of music
infringement cases, alongside only the literary content of any accompa-
nying lyrics. Rhythm, harmony, orchestration, and organizational struc-
ture are ostensibly peripheral.5  As far as copyright is concerned, many
1 ALFRED RICHARD OLIVER, THE ENCYCLOPEDISTS AS CRITICS OF MUSIC 43 (1947)
(quoting and translating Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Musique, in io ENCYCLOPfDIE, OU DICTION-
NAIRE RAISONNE DES SCIENCES, DES ARTS ET DES MfTIERS 898, gol (Denis Diderot & Jean
le Rond d'Alembert eds., Neufchastel, Samuel Faulche & Compagnie 1765)).
2 See, e.g., Charles Cronin, Concepts of Melodic Similarity in Music-Copyright Infringement
Suits, in MELODIC SIMILARITY: CONCEPTS, PROCEDURES, AND APPLICATIONS 187, 188
(Walter B. Hewlett & Eleanor Selfridge-Field eds., 1998) ("Although plaintiffs invariably claim mu-
sical rather than melodic infringement, courts pay little attention to rhythm, harmony, or other
elements of music. They mention them, if at all, as support for their findings of melodic similari-
ties."); Mark Osteen, Rhythm Changes: Contrafacts, Copyright, and Jazz Modernism, in MODERN-
ISM AND COPYRIGHT 89, 102 (Paul K. Saint-Amour ed., 2011) ("[T]he bulk of twentieth-century
legal rulings affirm that melody is the primary consideration in determining originality and infringe-
ment."); Leon R. Yankwich, Legal Protection of Ideas - A Judge's Approach, 43 VA. L. REV. 375,
388 (1957) ("[Wihether we are dealing with music of the highest quality or popular music, originality
lies in the arrangement of the musical notes so that they form a tune or air."); Melody, MUSIC
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT RESOURCE, http://mcir.usc.edu/glossary/M-R/Pages/Melody.html
[https://perma.cc/JVLg-gVR5] ("Melody is overwhelmingly the single most important feature of a
musical work in evaluating the merits of copyright infringement claims. The entire corpus of judicial
opinions in the area of music copyright infringement dwells on melody as the single most idiosyn-
cratic element of the works in question . . . ."). For further discussion, see infra Part I, pp. 1870-92.
3 A standard, if more formal, definition is "pitched sounds arranged in musical time in accord-
ance with given cultural conventions and constraints." Melody, OXFORD MUSIC ONLINE:
GROVE MUSIC ONLINE (Jan. 20, 2ooi), https://doi.org/io.1093/gmo/9781561g59263o.article.18357
[https://perma.cc/BG93-BGXV].
4 N. Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); accord
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443, 449-50, 450 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
See, e.g., N. Music, 105 F. Supp. at 400 (concluding that rhythm and harmony are categori-
cally in the public domain and that neither "can in itself be the subject of copyright"); Joanna
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aspects of your favorite recording wouldn't truly be part of the musical
work that the recording embodies.6
Yet lately that conventional wisdom has seemed imperiled. In 2015,
musicians Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams were found liable for
infringement in a headline-grabbing trial over their hit "Blurred Lines."
Accused of infringing the copyright in Marvin Gaye's "Got to Give It
Up," Thicke and Williams acknowledged a stylistic overlap between the
two songs but insisted that the lack of melodic similarity precluded any
claim of infringement.8 The jury disagreed, awarding the Gaye estate
over $7 million in damages.9 The court subsequently upheld the evi-
dentiary sufficiency of the verdict based on a "constellation" of similar-
ities between the two pieces' basslines, keyboard parts, and vocal con-
tours.10  It emphasized an expert witness's conclusion that these
features, though lacking a note-to-note melodic correspondence, were
nevertheless "the 'heartbeat of the songs,' or the 'pulse that runs through
the song and drives each song.""' Mixed anatomical metaphors aside,
the holding seems a far cry from the familiar view that melody alone
provides "the finger prints of the composition."12 And while some had
predicted a reversal on appeal,13 a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit
Demers, Sound-Alikes, Law, and Style, 83 UMKC L. REV. 303, 303-04 (2014) ("[C]opyright law
suggests that the center or essence of a musical composition is its melody (and lyrics, if present).
The outskirts of the musical work are inhabited by supposedly incidental qualities like harmony,
rhythm, and timbre - aesthetically important to be sure, but possessing no property status.");
Jeffrey G. Sherman, Musical Copyright Infringement: The Requirement of Substantial Similarity,
22 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 81, 129 (1972) ("[Iff the melodic similarities extend over a long
enough stretch of music, it would seem that no amount of nonmelodic differences - rhythm, har-
mony, accompaniment, or mood - should shield the defendant.").
6 See I MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.05 [A],
Lexis (database updated Nov. 2017) ("[It stretches matters too far to conclude that everything on
the recording forms part of the musical composition.").
See Ben Sisario & Noah Smith, "Blurred Lines" Infringed on Marvin Gaye Copyright, Jury
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2myFTw8 [https://perma.cc/H5TT-7MgF].
8 E.g., Reporter's Transcript of Tial Proceedings at 73, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No.
13-cv-o6004 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015), ECF No. 331 (asserting during opening statement that "the
most important factor . . . as to determine whether or not there is a similarity" is that "there are not
two consecutive notes with[] the same duration and location in the two songs"); Memorandum of
Points and Authorities at 2, Williams, No. 13-cv-o6004, ECF No. 89 ("The alleged melodic 'simi-
larities' . . . do not contain two consecutive notes with the same pitch and duration and placement
in the measure (i.e., rhythm) in both songs. This is highly unusual in an infringement claim.").
9 See Williams, No. 13-cv-o6oo4, 2015 WL 4479500, at *1, aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Williams v. Gaye, Nos. 15-5688o, 16-55089, 16-55626, 2018 WL 1403577 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2018).
The court subsequently reduced the figure to approximately $5.3 million. See id. at *29-30.
10 See id. at *21-23.
11 Id. at *22 (quoting Reporter's Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 53, Williams, No. 13-cv-
06004, ECF No. 336 (testimony of Judith Finell)).
12 N. Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
1 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Why the "Blurred Lines" Copyright Verdict Should Be Thrown Out, NEW
YORKER (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/why-the-blurred-lines-
copyright-verdict-should-be-thrown-out [https://perma.cc/ZNJ2-KVT8].
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affirmed the judgment on procedural grounds just before this Article
went to press.1 4
It's tough to overstate the amount of controversy that the case has
generated. Judge Nguyen, the dissenting judge on the appellate panel,
called the decision the first to permit "copyright[ing] a musical style,"
branding it "a dangerous precedent that strikes a devastating blow to
future musicians and composers everywhere."1 5  Ever since the jury's
verdict, similar concerns have become widespread in both legal and mu-
sical circles. Several copyright analysts have panned the trial court's
reliance on nonmelodic elements as legal error.16 A former general coun-
sel of the National Music Publishers' Association blamed the decision
for making "fuzzier" a once-straightforward system in which "melody
and lyrics were the basis of all infringement claims."" Many musicolo-
gists describe it as a departure from the popular legal consciousness re-
garding permissible borrowing," some even arguing as amici in the case
that music infringement disputes "invariably focus on the melodies of
14 Williams, 2018 WL 1403577, at *23.
15 Id. (Nguyen, J., dissenting).
16 See, e.g., Erin Fuchs, That Huge "Blurred Lines" Verdict Came Out of Left Field and Sets a
Terrible Precedent, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. II, 2015, 3:30 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
copyright-lawyers-are-shocked-by-the-robin-thicke-blurred-lines-verdict-2015-3 [https://perma.cc/
GA8T-RQL2] (quoting Professor Christopher Sprigman's commentary that "[m]elody is copyright-
able . . . . 'Blurred Lines' sounds something like the Marvin Gaye song. The reason they sound
alike is they're in the same genre. They don't have the same melody."); Adam Pasick, A Copyright
Victory for Marvin Gaye's Family Is Terrible for the Future of Music, QUARTZ (Mar. 10, 2015),
https://qz.com/36o12 6/a-copyright-victory-for-marvin-gayes-family-is-terrible-for-the-future-of-music/
[https://perma.cc/3ERZ-A4J6] (arguing that if copyright were to protect more than melody, it would
improperly propertize the "feel" of a song); Wu, supra note 13 (arguing that the court committed a
"serious error" in letting the dispute ever reach a jury because the accused infringers could not be
liable if they did not copy "any actual sequence of notes").
17 Ben Sisario, Led Zeppelin's "Stairway to Heaven" to Be Scrutinized in Court in Copyright
Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2uzdivV [https://perma.cc/R436-7UHD].
18 See, e.g., Joe Bennett, Did Robin Thicke Steal "Blurred Lines" from Marvin Gaye?, JOE
BENNETT (Feb. i, 2014), https://joebennett.net/2014/02/oi/did-robin-thicke-steal-a-song-from-marvin-
gaye [https://perma.cc/ggHV-UA8T] (providing a musicologist's pretrial stance that "[t]he Gaye and
Thicke recordings sound very similar to each other, but they use different notes, so it would be
difficult to make a case that the composition has been plagiarised"); Chi Chi Izundu, Music Industry
"Paranoid" After Pharrell Williams, Robin Thicke Blurred Lines Case, BBC: NEWSBEAT (Oct.
14, 2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/343895 73/music-industry-paranoid-after-pharrell-
williams-robin-thicke-blurred-lines-case [https://perma.cc/8JQU-7D5 D] (quoting a musicologist's
position that "there are no two consecutive notes in the vocal melodies or even the bass lines that
occur in the same place for the same duration. They are, by definition, different songs"); Randy
Lewis, Brian Wilson, Bonnie McKee, and Others React to "Blurred Lines" Verdict, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 14, 2015, 4:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/music/la-et-ms-blurred-lines-
reaction-brian-wilson-bonnie-mckee-20150314-story.html [https://perma.cc/28JN-SB6W] (quoting a
songwriting professor's comments that the verdict could have "significant ramifications for pop
music creators" because it "appears to go beyond the elements of a song that may be a copyright -
primarily melodies and lyrics - and extends to tempo, feel and instrumentation").
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two songs."19 As one professor and frequent expert witness in music
copyright infringement cases explained: "Melody tends to be the meat in
a copyright issue. That's what gets you at the musical expression that's
ultimately the test of whether there's ultimately been an infringement."2 0
Another opined that the verdict "represent[ed] a sea change" in the copy-
right scope granted to musical works, which "for the past century until
this verdict . . . ha[d] privileged only two elements as being deserving of
protection . . . the melody and the lyrics," and which was now for the
first time expanding to cover "other elements of a composition" like
rhythm, bassline, and "ephemeral things ... like timbre [and] instru-
mentation."2 1 Many musicians, accustomed to imitating nonmelodic el-
ements of the music they hear, now worry that the legal shadow in which
they've long worked is shifting unpredictably.2 2 A public radio program
that was devoted to the case led off by observing that "a lot of composers
wonder[] if copyright is now being extended to cover not just song lyrics
19 Brief of Amicus Curiae Musicologists in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees at
2, Williams, Nos. 15-5688o, 16-55089, 16-55626, ECF No. 20.
20 Brian Wise & Naomi Lewin, Detecting Music Plagiarism, After the "Blurred Lines" Case,
WQXR (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.wqxr.org/story/detecting-music-plagiarism-post-blurred-lines-
case/ [https://perma.cc/2SDF-A36F] (quoting Professor Lawrence Ferrara).
21 Tom Ashbrook, "Blurred Lines" in Music Copyright Fight at 3:26-4:34, WBUR: ON POINT,
(Mar. 1-7, 2015), http://onpoint.wbur.org/2015/03/I-7/blurred-lines-copyright-robin-thicke-marvin-
gaye-pharell [https://perma.cc/RN5A-3HVQ] (quoting musicologist Joanna Demers); see also id. at
5:Io-:18 (quoting entertainment lawyer and music business management Professor John Kellogg
agreeing that "over the past ioo years basically the melody and the lyrics have been the things that's
really been protected"); Joanna Demers, Blurry, MUSICOLOGY Now (Mar. 27, 2015), http://
musicologynow.ams-net.org/201-5/03/blurry.html [https://perma.cc/LF5C-JQTX] (observing that,
before commencement of the case, "most musicians, lawyers, and industry observers thought that
the laws ... were clear ... [that] [m]elody and lyrics cannot be copied without permission ...
[while] [r]hythm, harmony, and style are all subject to copying").
22 See, e.g., "Blurred Lines" Verdict Could Have Chilling Consequences, CBS NEWS (Mar. ii,
2015, 10:45 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pharrell-robin-thicke-blurred-lines-guilty-verdict-
impact-music-industry/ [https://perma.cc/ARCg-7N24] (quoting a music journalist's reaction that
the verdict departed from the principle that "[tihe one and only part of a composition that's really
protected by copyright is the melody of the song"); Lauretta Charlton, A Copyright Expert Explains
the "Blurred Lines" Ruling, VULTURE (Mar. II, 2015, 3:11 PM), http://www.vulture.com/
2015/03/what-the-blurred-lines-ruling-means-for-music.html [https://perma.cc/Z23J-RZNB] (quot-
ing a music producer's observation that in copyright "rhythm hasn't been taken as seriously" be-
cause "[w]hen we think of copyright infringement, we think of a melody being stolen. . . . [Melody
has] always been the main indicator of copyright. I own my melodies."); Victoria Kim et al.,
"Blurred Lines" Ruling Stuns the Music Industry, L.A. TIMES (Mar. II, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://
www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-blurred-lines-ruling-roiled-the-music-industry-2015031ic-story.
html [https://perma.cc/JH4K-DYDX] (referencing longtime industry executive Irving Azoff's ob-
servation that copyright disputes "were normally resolved between music business insiders based
on how many notes in a row were shared by two songs"); Jody Rosen, Questlove on Working with
Elvis Costello, Miley's Twerking, and His Lunchtime D.J. Sets, VULTURE (Sep. 18, 2013, 1:15 PM),
http://www.vulture.com/20I-3/09/questlove-on-his-new-album-with-elvis-costello.html [https://perma.
cc/3 EX6-NPHQ] (quoting Questlove before the trial stating that copying musical style should be
permitted but that "[i]f it were a case of melodic plagiarism, I would definitely side with the [Gaye]
estate").
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and melody but much else - tone, rhythm, tempo."2 3 USA Today ran
a column after the verdict indicating that the case could give rise to a
"new ambulance-chasing business ... in the music industry" and quot-
ing a Billboard editor's warning that the entire industry would need to
tread carefully "with anything that feels similar [to or] inspired by some-
thing else."2 4
Some fret that we're already witnessing a "'Blurred Lines' Effect"
in which nervous composers prophylactically award songwriter credits
(and the accompanying slice of royalties) to anyone who has previously
written a vaguely reminiscent song.2 5 One artist who's felt the brunt of
that effect explained that "[w]e're all standing on the shoulders of giants.
There's nothing that hasn't been done."2 6
Yet if there's nothing new under the sun when trying to create music,
neither is there anything new when trying to define it. Nearly a century
ago, a similar controversy played out across the Atlantic. In 1922, a
British composer named Frederic Austin produced the smash hit of his
day when he arranged new musical accompaniments for the then-
obscure John Gay opera Polly.27 The opera, a sequel to Gay's more
widely known The Beggar's Opera, had been published in 1729 in a bare-
bones arrangement of vocal melodies and accompanying basslines.28
Austin took the existing melodies and composed new musical settings
23 Wise & Lewin, supra note 20.
24 Andrea Mandell, "Blurred" Verdict Is Bad News for Music Biz, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2015,
9:03 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/music/2015/03/I-o/pharrell-responds-music-industry-
reacts/24727763/ [https://perma.cc/M2 Q3-97 7 Y].
25 Dee Lockett, Miguel Credited Billy Corgan on "1gyg"-Sounding New Song so He Wouldn't
Get Marvin Gaye'd, VULTURE (July 15, 2015, 12:07 PM), http://www.vulture.com/2015/o7/miguel-
credits-billy-corgan-on-a-new-song.html [https://perma.cc/2UY4 -BHUK]; see also Ed Christman,
"Uptown Funk!" Gains More Writers After Gap Band's Legal Claim, BILLBOARD (May 1, 2015,
12:21 AM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/6553523/uptown-funk-gains-five-co-writers [https://
perma.cc/83T8-UW2W] (quoting an industry executive's observation that, after the verdict,
"[e]veryone is being a little more cautious[ - ] ... [n]obody wants to be involved in a lawsuit");
Megan Coane & Maximillian Verrelli, Digital Feature, Blurring Lines? The Practical Implications
of Williams v. Bridgeport Music, LANDSLIDE MAG., Jan.-Feb. 2016, at I, 5, https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/landslide/2o1-6-january-february/ABALAND-
voo8no3_blurringlines the-practical implications of williams -v bridgeportmusic.authcheckdam.
pdf [https://perma.cc/HRCg-CZHU] ("As a result of the 'Blurred Lines' case, we are more likely to
see preemptive writing credits given to original composers whose works are allegedly infringed, the
prompt settlement of cases of alleged infringement to avoid costly litigation and negative press, and
fewer lawsuits overall in response to this dangerous precedent.").
26 Miguel Explores Race, Finds New Voice on "Wildheart," BILLBOARD (July 13, 2015),
http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/6627416/miguel-explores-race-finds-new-voice-on-wildheart
[https://perma.cc/B3ZY-4TUT].
27 See Austin v. Columbia Graphophone Co. [1923] MacG. Cop. Cas. 398, 400 (Ch.) (Eng.) (de-
scribing the 1922 London production of Polly as "an immediate success" and "one of the most pop-
ular musical entertainments of the day").
28 Id. at 399.
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and orchestrations for them.2 9 Seeing the runaway success of the new
production, the Columbia Graphophone Company sought to release a
recording of musical highlights, only to learn that Austin had signed an
exclusive deal with a different record label.3 0 Believing that the only
copyrightable content of Polly was the melodies, which were already in
the public domain, Columbia dispatched its music director to the British
Museum to copy out those melodies from Gay's original edition and then
add his own arrangements - which ended up sounding a lot like
Austin's.3 1 Columbia released a recording of those soundalike arrange-
ments, and Austin sued in chancery court for infringement.
The ensuing bench trial teed up the same question in early twentieth-
century England as the "Blurred Lines" case did in early twenty-first-
century America: Can one infringe the copyright in a musical work if
one never copies a melody? Austin argued that, new melodies or not,
his arrangements were original enough in themselves that copyright
should subsist in them.3 2 Columbia took the position that "so long as
Mr. Austin's actual notes and bars were not copied," it was "at liberty
to orchestrate, lengthen, quicken, introduce imitative and chorus effects,
and generally dress up the tune in the same way as the plaintiff."3 3
Strikingly, in an appeal to creativity policy that could easily be mistaken
for a modern critique of the "Blurred Lines" decision, the former organ-
ist of Westminster Abbey argued as an expert witness that the court
should adopt the defendants' bright-line test:
The need is for a guiding rule. The principle that there is only copyright in
a sequence of notes is a rough and ready rule which may not be perfect in
its application to all cases, but it is intelligible and clear. Any other principle
will certainly be very difficult for the musician to apply, and almost impos-
sible for a lawyer, himself probably inexpert, to interpret.34
Unmoved, the court sided with the plaintiff, reasoning that copyright
should subsist "in a combination of ideas, methods, and devices used
and expressed in and going to form part of a new and original work,
based though it be on old airs."3 5
It's taken the United States an extra ninety years, but the "Blurred
Lines" judgment has finally compelled a similar reevaluation here of
just what the law means when it says "music." In fact, the answer is no
longer anywhere near as uniform as the popular condemnation of the
29 See id. at 400 ("[A]lithough Mr. Austin takes the melody from Gay's airs he alters the structure
of the music and his whole scheme of harmony is a departure from [the existing] setting of the same
airs and produces a different effect to the ear.").
30 See id. at 401.
31 Id. at 401-03.
32 Id. at 403-04.
3 Id. at 403.
34 Id. at 406-07 (quoting a letter from Sir Frederick Bridge).
35 Id. at 408.
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outcome would suggest. Recent (and significantly less scrutinized) dis-
trict court decisions have held that copyright protection could extend to
a piece's rhythm, percussion, or instrumental riffs.3 6 The Sixth Circuit
has upheld an infringement verdict based on copying vocal refrains of
a particular rhythm and timbre.3  Dicta from the Ninth Circuit likewise
suggest hat one could infringe a musical work by copying some permu-
tation of "chord progression, key, tempo, rhythm, and genre."3  These
decisions are arguably consistent with the jury verdict against Thicke
and Williams, yet are inarguably inconsistent with the prevailing belief
that copyright considers a composition to be little more than its tune.
"Blurred Lines" is a symptom, not a cause, of confusion over just what
copyright's theory of the musical work is.
That confusion may only now be getting serious attention, but it had
been lying dormant for decades. As I discuss below in Part I of this
Article, the judges and commentators who endorsed the equation of mu-
sic with melody did so based on specific views of what makes music
creative. Consciously or not, courts adopted the view of nineteenth-
century European music theorists and critics who saw melody as a mu-
sical work's aesthetic core. The ontology of music in the courthouse
reflected the ontology of music in the concert hall.
Today, however, this unidimensional scope is doubly puzzling. Part
II explains why. First, it's anomalous within the modern copyright sys-
tem. Copyright protects original expression, but not the underlying
ideas being expressed.3 9 For most subject matter, that broad eligibility
principle means that any number of individual elements as well as their
combination are potentially protectable.4 0  To the extent that music
copyright reduces to melody, the regime is unusually narrow.
Second, it rests on a myopic view of musical creativity. Many genres
deemphasize melody and innovate around other elements. Over the last
150 years, composers have originated far more than just tunes, from new
harmonic sequences in Western art music to new percussion loops in
hip-hop to new guitar vamps in alternative rock. A monomaniacal focus
on melody pushes all of these beyond copyright's pale of expression -
but why?
The answer, as I argue in Part III, is not the one that the classical
doctrine provides. Instead, it's the one hinted at by that Westminster
Abbey organist so many years ago: the interests of second comers.4 1 The
36 See New Old Music Grp., Inc. v. Gottwald, 122 F. Supp. 3d 78, 83 & n.i (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(drumbeat); BMS Entm't/Heat Music LLC v. Bridges, No. 04 Civ. 2584, 2005 WL 1593013, at *3-
5 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2005) (rhythmic pattern); ZZ Top v. Chrysler Corp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 983, 985
(W.D. Wash. 1999) (guitar riff).
37 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 2 72-73 (6th Cir. 2009).
38 Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2004).
3 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
40 See infra Part II, pp. 1892-1903.
41 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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conventional, melody-obsessed wisdom is the right approach after all -
it's just the rationale that needs to change. Infringement doctrine's em-
phasis on a work's melody should be justified not as a recognition of its
composer's creativity but rather as a facilitation of downstream com-
posers' future creativity. Music cases have provided subsequent gener-
ations with what by copyright's standards is an uncharacteristically
clear boundary to work around: to avoid infringement, avoid the tune.
Because music is perceived to be relatively modular, with melody often
distinguishable from other constitutive elements, both downstream com-
posers and judges can confine their infringement inquiry to a narrow
field.
That model, which could be generalized to some other subject matter
besides music, as Part IV discusses, offers advantages over the "every-
thing counts" analysis for other expressive media, where the analysis is
often scattershot and unpredictable. Few are satisfied with the muddle
that is copyright's substantial-similarity test, and this Article is not the
first to lament the pathological uncertainty surrounding its applica-
tion.4 2 The history of music copyright, however, offers an underappre-
ciated and important example of a clearer, albeit narrower, approach.
Unlike our patent system, which has tried to develop an infrastructure
that notifies downstream actors of the range of different products that
the owner can claim,4 3 the copyright system has seemingly been content
to throw up its hands, declare that any such notice is infeasible, and
leave everyone to guess just how far a copyrighted work's unwritten
penumbras and emanations go. But music copyright's old unidimen-
sional infringement standard, built on an underinclusive definition of
original expression, offers an unintentional glimpse at the functioning of
a copyright system that sacrifices an increment of scope for an increment
of clarity.
That tradeoff is one that the recent crop of music infringement cases
has not been willing to make. And at least so long as the only doctrinal
lever is the qualitative value of the copied expression, there is no reason
to make it. Substantial similarity isn't likely to deliver a different result
unless it starts making room for predictable similarity.
I. How COPYRIGHT DEFINES THE MUSICAL WORK
Music has been copyrightable subject matter in the United States
since 183].44 For much of the time since then, as I outline in section A
below, music plagiarism cases have revolved around a single dimension.
The coin of the realm was melody, whose imitation has tended to be
42 See infra Part III, pp. 1903-18.
43 See infra pp. 1904-05.
44 See Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, §§ i, 4, 5, 7, 8, ii, 4 Stat. 436, 436-38.
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both necessary and sufficient to sustain an infringement claim.4 5 If one
copied a protected work's melody, one was liable even if other elements
were not copied.4 6 And if one didn't copy melody, liability was unlikely.
These days, the sufficiency is still there - copying melody seemingly
remains as proscribed as it ever was. But, as I explain in section B, the
necessity is changing. A handful of recent court cases, most visibly but
certainly not exclusively the "Blurred Lines" infringement verdict, have
begun to nudge infringement analysis toward finding liability even with-
out any melodic copying to speak of.
What should count as music infringement is up for grabs. There's
lamentably little dialogue between legal scholars and musicologists, two
groups that could offer each other helpful expertise on the topic. Many
in the legal community continue to point to melody as music's primary
element under copyright, sometimes with a polite but brief nod to
rhythm and harmony.47 More abstract concepts like timbre are often
excluded entirely.48 Indicative of this approach is a recent study that
45 In Professor Alex Sayf Cummings's summary, "[t]raditionally, the law protected only what
could be written down on the page - the lyrics and melody of a song - not its rhythm, timbre, or
tone." Alex Sayf Cummings, The "Blurred Lines" of Music and Copyright: Part One, OUPBLOG
(Apr. 28, 2015), http://blog.oup.com/201-5/04/blurred-lines-copyright-part-one/ [https://perma.cc/
CFZ3-3SNX].
46 See, e.g., ALFRED M. SHAFTER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 199 (2d ed. 1939) ("[O]ne may copy
a melody by changing the rhythm - and still be infringing."); Sherman, supra note 5, at 129 ("[I1f
the melodic similarities extend over a long enough stretch of music, it would seem that no amount
of nonmelodic differences - rhythm, harmony, accompaniment, or mood - should shield the
defendant.").
47 See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.8 & n.i3 (3 d ed. 2005 &
Supp. 2017) (citing Northern Music's "finger prints" passage for the proposition that "[b]ecause
melody is so salient, and is relatively unconstrained by musical convention, it is typically the prin-
cipal vessel of originality in musical compositions"); I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.05 [B]
(noting the split of authority on harmony and rhythm and the safe conclusion that melody is "the
usual source of protection for musical compositions"); ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R.
THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADE-
MARKS § 4.2, at 51 (2003) (quoting Northern Music for the prevailing definition of a musical work
under copyright law); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, A Musical Work Is a Set of Instructions, 52 HOUS.
L. REV. 467, 498 (2014) ("In analyzing the music composition copyright, consideration of infringe-
ment tends to be limited to three principal notated musical features: melody, which is typically given
primary consideration, and to a lesser extent harmony and rhythm."); Margit Livingston & Joseph
Urbinato, Copyright Infringement of Music: Determining Whether What Sounds Alike Is Alike, 15
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 227, 278, 292 (2013) (observing that "melody drives the infringement
bus," id. at 278, and that "[j]ust as words are the basic components of novels and lines of computer
code are the fundamental elements of software programs, pitches are the building blocks of musical
works.... [I]n comparing two musical works, experts should focus on the identity (or lack thereof)
between the pitches of each composition," id. at 292); Michael Zaken, Note, Fragmented Literal
Similarity in the Ninth Circuit: Dealing with Fragmented Takings of Jazz and Experimental Music,
37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 283, 290 (2014) ("[W]hile a few courts have found the possibility of crea-
tivity in rhythm or harmony, most courts look to melody alone as the main source of creativity."
(footnote omitted)).
48 Cf Jamie Lund, An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test in Music Composition
Copyright Infringement, VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 137, 144-45 (2011) (conceptualizing the elements
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characterized a musician's choice to incorporate particular synthesized
sounds in a rhythmic pattern as "demonstrat[ing] hardly more original
authorship than does a decision to print a phone directory using a par-
ticular font, or to paint a wall a certain color."4 9 Others see the primacy
historically attached to melody as a misstatement of law borne out of an
availability heuristic. According to them, courts pay melody so much
attention not because of copyright doctrine but rather because of all the
other unoriginal elements in the pop songs that tend to trigger copyright
litigation.5o
Meanwhile, several prominent musicologists who specialize in music
copyright disputes have expressed exasperation that the law in the wake
of the "Blurred Lines" verdict might suddenly protect something more
than melody.5 1 The way things have always worked, the story goes,
"only tunes and words are explicitly covered, while rhythm, instrumen-
tation, timbre, and tempo remain in the vague terrain of phenomena
that, each on its own, remain without protection."5 2 Measured against
that baseline, the jury's verdict was a "sea change."5 3
As for musicians, at least those who have been speaking with the
press, many reveal a similar sense of incredulity at the notion that non-
of "phrasing, style, genre, tempo, key, timbre, and orchestration," id. at 145, as belonging to a par-
ticular performance rather than to the performed work itself).
49 Charles Cronin, I Hear America Suing: Music Copyright Infringement in the Era of Elec-
tronic Sound, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1227-28 (2015).
5o See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:93 & n.8 (2018 update) (noting
that "[o]riginality in a musical composition consists not just of melody or harmony, but also in the
combination of these two in addition to any other elements, such as rhythm or orchestration," id.
§ 3:93 (footnote omitted), and arguing that "[w]hile conventional harmonic progressions are not
protected, there is plenty of room for originality in harmony," id. § 3:93 n.8); Paul J. Heald, Reviving
the Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy Machines, and New Arrangements of
Public Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241, 270 (1996) (arguing in the copyrightability context that
just because "much tinkering with rhythm is insignificant does not mean that an arranger cannot,
in fact, make an original contribution by making rhythmic changes"). Professor Robert Brauneis
makes another version of this argument based on the availability of expression amenable to written
notation, rather than on the availability of expression amenable to marketable originality. See
Robert Brauneis, Musical Work Copyright for the Era of Digital Sound Technology: Looking Beyond
Composition and Performance, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. I, 16 (2014) ("[I]n many of the
cases in which courts articulated a definition of musical works in terms of a finite list of elements,
they were not rejecting other elements proposed by one of the parties; rather, they were simply
articulating what they were used to seeing in thinly notated sheet music or lead sheets.").
1 See supra pp. 1865-66.
52 Joanna Demers, Music, Copies and Essences, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF POPULAR MU-
SIC 584, 589 (Andy Bennett & Steve Waksman eds., 2015).
3 See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also Lauretta Charlton, Why Copyright In-
fringement Became Pop's Big Problem, According to the "Blurred Lines" Musicologist, VULTURE
(Dec. ii, 2015, 12:10 PM), http://www.vulture.com/2015/12/why-copyright-infringement-became-
pops-big-problem.html [https://perma.cc/6LKS-CYL3] (quoting Professor Jeffrey Peretz's view that
reconstructing a song's rhythm is an "area where there are no rules - and that's what's changing
as a result of this case").
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melodic elements can be propertized.54 That reaction makes sense given
the borrowing norms within many music genres today. Producers have
gotten used to recreating existing beats and backing tracks, believing
that they aren't copyrightable.5 5  It's copying the melodies that brings
trouble. When Kelly Clarkson was accused in 2009 of plagiarizing a
Beyonc6 track based largely on similarity between the instrumental pro-
ductions, she defended herself by pointing out that "our melodies are
different." 5 6  That reflexive response suggests hat copying melody is
exceptional. It's transgressive in a way that copying any of the sur-
rounding elements isn't perceived to be.
But as I argue below, it's wrong to brand a single jury verdict as a
departure from the rules of what can be copied. Copyright policymakers
should be far more focused on the regime that let the claim reach a jury
to begin with than on what the jury did once it got there.5  And that
regime is not nearly so dismissive of the trial court's legal rulings as is
popularly imagined. The "Blurred Lines" case was preceded by, and
has since been followed by, several precedential holdings that have
shifted the boundaries of music infringement more than the vagaries of
a jury ever could. What the verdict did do is make startlingly visible
just how weak the legal edifice supporting a melody-only standard has
always been.58
A. The Long Reign of Unidimensional Similarity
The emphasis on the tune within music copyright generally tracks a
similar emphasis within classical Western musical aesthetics. In the
mid-eighteenth century, Rousseau theorized that harmony, rhythm, and
orchestration were ultimately subordinate to melody.5 9 In his view, later
encapsulated in his entry on music for Diderot's Encyclopidie that is
54 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
5 See JOHN SEABROOK, THE SONG MACHINE: INSIDE THE HIT FACTORY 201 (2015).
56 James Montgomery, Kelly Clarkson to Put Ryan Tedder Drama to Bed on Upcoming Tour,
MTV NEWS (Sept. 18, 2oog), http://www.mtv.com/news/i621-839/kelly-clarkson-to-put-ryan-
tedder-drama-to-bed-on-upcoming-tour/ [https://perma.cc/2 VRA-R5 SD].
5 Indeed, the verdict itself might very well have been influenced more by the personalities of
the parties involved than by any particular legal instructions. See Cronin, supra note 49, at 1231
("[I]t appears that the verdict was based mainly on the jurors' opprobrium of the characters and
veracity of Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams."). During trial, jurors saw Thicke explain in his
videotaped deposition testimony that he did not consider himself an "honest person" and that, dur-
ing interviews in which he had described the genesis of the song, "I tell whatever I want to say to
help sell records." Associated Press, Deposition with Robin Thicke, Pharrell Released, YOUTUBE
(Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bqpot5VNobY [https://perma.cc/4EN3-8B46].
8 See Demers, supra note 2 1 ("The idea that copyright only protects melody and lyrics, while
situationally true, is a thought-fiction, a crutch that over time has helped us to bypass a messier
truth: copyright law says very little about what in a musical composition it protects. This fiction
has been repeated without qualification or nuance to the point that it has become a myth.").
9 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Letter on French Music, in ESSAY ON THE ORIGIN OF
LANGUAGES AND WRITINGS RELATED TO MUSIC 141, 154-55 (John T Scott ed. & trans., 1998).
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quoted in this Article's epigraph, any composer who didn't comprehend
that relationship would ultimately fail to evoke any emotions within the
listener.6 0  "Music," he wrote, "depicts only by means of Melody and
draws all its force from it," such that without melody music would
"wear[y] the ears and always leave[] the heart cold."6 1 Melody unified a
musical work just as action unified a dramatic tragedy.62 To succeed as
a piece of music, "the whole ensemble must convey only one melody to
the ear and only one idea to the mind."63 Harmony was like the colors
in a painting, which, in Rousseau's view, could convey pleasure but not
meaning. Melody alone made music a language.64
By the nineteenth century, various voices around Europe had
adopted the view that melody represents the kernel of musical expres-
sion.6s Many perceived melody to be music's vessel of romantic ge-
nius.66 Unlike other compositional facets, melody was seen as being
60 See OLIVER, supra note I, at 43.
61 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Dictionary of Music, in ESSAY ON THE ORIGIN OF LAN-
GUAGES AND WRITINGS RELATED TO MUSIC, supra note 59, at 366, 422.
62 ROUSSEAU, supra note 59, at 155.
63 Id.; see also JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, On the Principle of Melody, or Response to the
"Errors on Music," in ESSAY ON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGES AND WRITINGS RELATED TO
MUSIC, supra note 59, at 260, 269 (arguing that "harmony and sounds... are actually only the
instruments of the melody," and that "if the Musician thinks only of his harmony, if he neglects the
essential part, which is the song, in order to chase after chords and filling it out, he will produce a
great deal of noise and little effect, and his deafening Music will give much more pain to the head
than emotion to the heart").
64 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Essay on the Origin of Languages, in ESSAY ON THE
ORIGIN OF LANGUAGES AND WRITINGS RELATED TO MUSIC, supra note 59, at 289, 320-2]
("Melody does in music precisely what design does in painting; it is melody that indicates the con-
tours and figures, of which the accords and sounds are but the colors. . . . If there were nothing but
[colors or sounds] in them, they would both be counted among the ranks of the natural sciences,
and not the fine arts. It is imitation [of nature] alone that elevates them to that rank. Now, what
makes painting an imitative art? It is design. What makes music another? It is melody."); JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Examination of Two Principles Advanced by M. Rameau in His Brochure
Entitled: "Errors on Music in the Encyclopedia," in ESSAY ON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGES
AND WRITINGS RELATED TO MUSIC, supra note 59, at 271, 279 ("The most beautiful chords, like
the most beautiful colors, can convey to the senses a pleasant sensation and nothing more.... It is
by means of [melodies] that music becomes oratorical, eloquent, imitative, they form its language;
it is by means of them that it depicts objects to the imagination, that it conveys feelings to the heart.
Melody is in music what design is in Painting, harmony produces merely the effect of colors. It is
by means of the song, not by means of the chords, that sounds have expression, fire, life; it is the
song alone that gives them the moral effects that produce all of Music's energy.").
65 The composer Jean-Phillipe Rameau, Rousseau's frequent sparring partner in matters of mu-
sic theory, took the opposite position. He argued that music was a mathematical science whose
guiding feature was harmony, not melody. Colm Kiernan, Additional Reflections on Diderot and
Science, 14 DIDEROT STUD. 113, 138 (1971). But it was Rousseau's view that won popular sup-
port. Id. ("Notwithstanding the disapproval of musical connoisseurs, in our own day it is the me-
lodic principle which has triumphed in popular music: to that extent it is Rousseau who has tri-
umphed over Rameau.").
66 See MATTHEw GELBART, THE INVENTION OF "FOLK MUSIC" AND "ART MUSIC" 215-
16 (2007) (describing the aesthetic theory under which "genius (as nature) had been mapped onto
melody and artifice had been mapped onto harmony and counterpoint," id. at 215, leaving melody
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unteachable, acquired only by divine gift.67 "Melody," the music direc-
tor of the Konigsberg Theater wrote in 1855, "cannot be taught ... We
may criticize it here and there, but we cannot improve it, or it is no
melody."68  Hegel's aesthetic theory, like Rousseau's, championed mel-
ody over harmony as the universalizing element of musical language.6 9
Adolf Bernhard Marx singled out melody for its capacity to stand inde-
pendently and unadorned: "[M]elody is the simpler substance and pre-
cedes and is primary to harmony, which cannot form an artwork by
itself, as melody is famously able to do (e.g. in unaccompanied song)." 0
Whatever the justifying theory, melody attained outsized importance
in nineteenth-century musical practice and reception. The usual com-
positional process was first to create music at the piano and then subse-
quently orchestrate it, reflecting the subordination of timbre to pitch."
When asked why he preferred to compose for violin despite his training
as a pianist, composer Max Bruch explained that "the violin can sing a
melody better than the piano can, and melody is the soul of music."7 2
Wagner, echoing his contemporaries' views, pointed to melody as the
litmus test for creative talent.3 Indeed, a composer who sacrificed tunes
for the sake of other musical innovations did so at his own peril. Despite
lauding melody as much as his peers did, Wagner himself was excori-
ated in some circles for ostensibly neglecting it in his operas. Upon
the "litmus test of originality" in the Romantic era, id. at 21i6); DAVID TRIPPETT, WAGNER'S
MELODIES: AESTHETICS AND MATERIALISM IN GERMAN MUSICAL IDENTITY 70-71 (2013).
67 TRIPPETT, supra note 66, at 70-7 1.
68 Id. at 74 (omission in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting E. Sobolewski, Reactionary Letters
(pt. 2), 33 MUSICAL WORLD 45, 45 (1855) (emphasis added)).
69 See Lawrence Kramer, The Mysteries of Animation: History, Analysis and Musical Subjec-
tivity, 20 MUSIC ANALYSIS 153, i6o (2001).
70 TRIPPETT, supra note 66, at 71 (quoting and translating ADOLF BERNHARD MARX, DIE
ALTE MUSIKLEHRE IM STREIT MIT UNSERER ZEIT i6 (Leipzig, Breitkopf & Htirtel 1841)).
German music theorist Johann Mattheson made a similar argument a century earlier in his treatise
The Perfect Chapelmaster. See EDWARD LIPPMAN, A HISTORY OF WESTERN MUSICAL AES-
THETICS 64 (1992) ("A piece for one voice even without accompaniment can very well exist, but a
so-called harmony without melody is only an empty sound and no vocal piece at all." (quoting
Mattheson, Der Volkommene Cappellmeister, in i MUSICAL AESTHETICS: A HISTORICAL READER
123, 125 (Edward A. Lippman ed., 1986))).
71 See KAREN PAINTER, SYMPHONIC ASPIRATIONS: GERMAN MUSIC AND POLITICS,
1900-1-945, at 83 (2007).
72 CHRISTOPHER FIFIELD, MAX BRUCH: HIS LIFE AND WORKS 24 (The Boydell Press, new
ed. 2005) ('998). A similar position has been attributed to Joseph Haydn. See Marion M. Scott,
Haydn: Fresh Facts and Old Fancies, 68 PROC. MUSICAL Ass'N 87, 92 (1942) (recounting Haydn's
comment, "the air - (i.e. the melody) - is the soul of music; it is the life, the spirit, the essence of
a composition").
73 RICHARD WAGNER, "Zukunftsmusik," in 3 RICHARD WAGNER'S PROSE WORKS 293, 333
(William Ashton Ellis trans., 1907) ("We will start with the axiom that music's only form is melody,
that it is not even thinkable apart from melody, that music and melody are absolutely indissever-
able.... [T]o say that any music has no melody ... simply announces the composer's lack of talent,
his want of originality, compelling him to cobble up his piece from melodic phrases often heard
before, and therefore leaving the ar indifferent.").
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hearing Wagner's music in 186a, one prominent reviewer commented
that "50 years on this path and music will be dead, because we will have
killed melody, and melody is music's soul."7 4  Composer and critic
E.T.A. Hoffman summed up the prevailing view when he characterized
melody as nothing less than "the primary and most exquisite thing in
music."7 5 As originality ascended to the rank of most desired quality of
art music over the course of the Romantic era, a work's melody became
the place where observers went to look for it.76
That primacy begot property. In 1829, German and Austrian music
publishers and retailers convened in Leipzig to agree contractually, in
the absence of effective statutory copyright protection, that they would
not copy each others' compositions." Two years later, in a follow-on
agreement drafted by composer and conductor Heinrich Dorn, the ma-
jor publishers specified melody as the relevant substance of those pro-
tected compositions: "Melody will be recognized as the exclusive prop-
erty of the publisher, and every arrangement that reproduces the
composer's notes and is only based on mechanical workmanship should
be seen as a reprint and be subject . . . to a fine of 5o Louis d'or."8
Small publishing houses, which couldn't afford the rights to publish
complete operas, protested that they should be able to print at least the
hit tunes in new, lighter arrangements.9 Citing the previous industry
agreement, a major publisher shot back with a dichotomy that continues
to influence music copyright today: those who create new melodies are
artists, while those who recontextualize those melodies are mere crafts-
men.8 0 "An illegal reprint," he explained, "is every reproduction requir-
74 Flora Willson, Future History: Wagner, Offenbach, and "La Musique de l'Avenir" in Paris,
186o, 30 OPERA Q. 287, 298 (2014) (quoting and translating Paul Bernard, Richard Wagner et la
Musique de l'Avenir, 27 LE MfNESTREL 65, 66 (i86o)).
7 TRIPPETT, supra note 66, at 12 (quoting and translating E.T.A. Hoffman, 17ber Einen
Ausspruch Sachini's, und ilber den Sogenannten Effekt in der Musik, in FANTASIESTUCKE IN
CALLOT'S MANIER: WERKE 1814, at 438, 444 (2006)).
76 See GELBART, supra note 66, at 217 ("[S]ince the lasting attachment to melody was now
bound to the new criterion of originality as a component of individual genius - the result was a
prejudice for melodic originality.").
77 See F.M. SCHERER, QUARTER NOTES AND BANK NOTES: THE ECONOMICS OF MUSIC
COMPOSITION IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES 176 (2004). In 1837,
Prussia became the first of the German states to grant formal copyright protection to authors. See
Friedemann Kawohl, Music Copyright and the Prussian Copyright Act of '837, in NINETEENTH-
CENTURY MUSIC: SELECTED PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE 281, 283 (Jim Samson & Bennett Zon eds., 2002).
78 TRIPPETT, supra note 66, at 137 (omission in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting and trans-
lating FRIEDEMANN KAWOHL, URHEBERRECT DER MUSIK IN PREUSSEN (1820-1840), at
239 (2002) (emphasis added)).
79 See Kawohl, supra note 77, at 290-91.
80 Id. at 291.
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ing mere mechanical skills if the creation of a modified form is not re-
garded as an intellectual product itself." 1 An arrangement of a preex-
isting tune met that definition.8 2 In sum, he concluded, "[flor judgments
concerning the publishing rights, the melody is to be presumed as a prin-
ciple."8 3 When the Saxon Copyright Act was passed in 1844, it included
a provision codifying this industry norm of "property in the melody."8 4
These developments reflected the legal recognition in Germany that, as
musicologist David Trippett notes, melody had become "the main pro-
tectable 'object' of a musical work."8 5
Around the same time, the propertization of melody was taking hold
in common law jurisdictions. 6 Likely the earliest judicial decision to
define music copyright in these terms came in the 1835 British case
D'Almaine v. Boosey.7 The dispute concerned a music publisher that
had rearranged arias from the 1834 opera Lestocq as instrumental dance
music. The Court of Exchequer held that the reorchestration did not
excuse copying the aria's tune, for "[i]t is the air or melody which is the
invention of the author, and which may in such case be the subject of
piracy." When listeners hear music, the court reasoned, they hear mel-
ody, and "the mere adaptation of the air, either by changing it to a dance
or by transferring it from one instrument to another, does not, even to
common apprehensions, alter the original subject. The ear tells you that
it is the same."9 The court viewed melody as establishing not just a
piece's identity but also its originality. It explained that the melody was
"that in which the whole meritorious part of the invention consists....
81 Id. (quoting and translating Fr. Hofmeister, Ueber Literarisches Eigenthum an Musikalischen
Compositionen, 23 JAHRBUCHER DES DEUTSCHEN NATIONAL-VEREINS FUR MUSIK UND
IHRE WISSENSCHAFT 177, 177 (1841)).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Friedemann Kawohl, Commentary on the Leipzig Music Publishers' Union Against Piracy
(1830), PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (2008), http://www.copyrighthistory.
org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_d_i83oa [https://perma.cc/MR7Y-VGHV].
85 TRIPPETT, supra note 66, at 137. Germany's prioritization of melody continues today in
section 24 of its Copyright Act. See Gezetz Ober Urheberrecht und Verwandte Schutzrechte
[Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I]
at 3346, § 24(2), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch-urhg/englisch-urhg.html [https://perma.
cc/CC29-QgHC] (providing that a "free use" defense "shall not apply to the use of a musical work
in which a melody is recognisably taken from the work and used as the basis for a new work").
86 Rousseau's writings on the aesthetic primacy of melody were widely circulated in Britain.
See GELBART, supra note 66, at 69.
87 (1835) i6o Eng. Rep. 117 (Ex.); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Opera and Copyright, THE MEDIA
INST. (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2013/08131i3.php [https://perma.cc/GPY4-
TVLA] (associating D'Almaine with the principle that "the essence of the work is its melody").




The original air requires the aid of genius for its construction, but a mere
mechanic in music can make the adaptation or accompaniment."9 0
This conclusion is especially surprising given the era's doctrinal tol-
erance for "fair abridgements." Today, the U.S. Copyright Act of 197691
(Copyright Act) considers a musical arrangement to be a derivative
work, whose preparation would be an infringement unless authorized
by the owner of the copyright in the underlying work.9 2 So, too, does
the equivalent law in the United Kingdom.9 3 But that legal infrastruc-
ture did not exist in 1835.94 Instead, defendants were free to argue in
equity that the creative effort they had invested in abridging an existing
work rendered them authors rather than infringers.9 5 As one court sum-
marized the doctrine, a noninfringing abridgement "should contain an
epitome of the work abridged - the principles, in a condensed form of
the original book,"9 6 and "[tlo abridge is to preserve the substance, the
essence of the work, in language suited to such a purpose."97
Arguably, taking individual arias from a lengthy operatic opus and
adapting them into light dance music would qualify. Not so, the
D'Almaine court decided. The relevant unit of analysis for assessing
abridgement was neither the opera as a whole nor even the musical set-
ting in which the aria's tune was embedded. It was, rather, the tune
itself. Adapters of musical works thus received far less license to operate
without the owner's permission than did adapters of literary works.98
D'Almaine's trope of the "mere mechanic in music" versus the inno-
vative melodist migrated to the United States, where it has held sway
through the years. In Jollie v. Jaques,99 decided in 1850, the defendants
had allegedly copied the plaintiff's piano arrangement of a public-
domain polka tune.10 0 The arranger had apparently "expended much
90 Id.
91 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
92 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (including "musical arrangement" in a statutory list of paradig-
matic derivative works).
93 See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 21( 3 )(b).
94 See 3 PATRY, supra note 50, § 9:98.
95 See Gyles v. Wilcox (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (Ch.) (holding that "abridgments may with
great propriety be called a new book," and therefore noninfringing, "because ... the invention,
learning, and judgment of the [secondary] author is shewn in them"); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (citing Gyles for the proposition that, under U.S. law, an
abridgement was "fair" and noninfringing if it included "real, substantial condensation of the ma-
terials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon"). For more on the intersection be-
tween early nineteenth-century fair abridgement doctrine and D'Almaine, see Ginsburg, supra note
87.
96 Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 172 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497).
97 Id. at 174.
98 See 3 PATRY, supra note 50, § 9:98 n.3 (discussing D'Almaine and noting that "[m]usical com-
positions . . . appear to have been treated differently" than literary works).
99 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7437).
100 Id. at 913.
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labor, time, and musical knowledge and skill, in preparing and produc-
ing" the work in suit.101 The defendants argued that they had not copied
anything material from the plaintiff, who had "made no change in the
[polka's] melody" and therefore had not "added any new matter to the
composition, or to the combination of the materials of the original air,
but had simply adapted the old melody to the piano-forte."1 0 2 Justice
Nelson, riding circuit, determined that the case could be resolved only
after the presentation of evidence and denied the plaintiff's motion for
a pretrial injunction.103  In so doing, he explained in terms virtually
identical to D'Almaine's that original melody gets more robust protec-
tion than does original orchestration:
The composition of a new air or melody is entitled to protection; and the
appropriation of the whole or of any substantial part of it without the license
of the author is a piracy . . . If the new air be substantially the same as the
old, it is no doubt a piracy; and the adaptation of it, either by changing it
to a dance, or by transferring it from one instrument to another, if the ear
detects the same air in the new arrangement, will not relieve it from the
penalty; and the addition of variations makes no difference. The original
air requires genius for its construction; but a mere mechanic in music, it is
said, can make the adaptation or accompaniment. 104
Across the turn of the century, legal rhetoric in the United States
continued to identify melody as the sine qua non of music copyright.
Perhaps the most famous Supreme Court encounter with music infringe-
ment, the 1908 case White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,105
characterized a musical work under the Copyright Act of 1870106 as "the
compilation of notes which, when properly played, produces the melody
which is the real invention of the composer."107 The composer's exclu-
sive right thus covered "the order of notes which produce the air or
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 914.
104 Id. at 913; accord Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1137 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552) (lauding
the reasoning in Jollie and D'Almaine as "eminently sound and just"). Jollie, unlike most of the
cases discussed in this section, assessed copyrightability rather than infringement. Another copy-
rightability case decided similarly under a subsequent version of the statute is Cooper v. James, 213
F. 871 (N.D. Ga. 1914), which denied protection for the addition of an alto line to an existing three-
part harmony because "anything which a fairly good musician can make, the same old tune being
preserved, could not be the subject of a copyright," id. at 872. As in Jollie, the court deemed the
"tune" to be the relevant work in which originality may subsist. But see Italian Book Co. v. Rossi,
27 F.2d 1014, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1928) (holding that a new arrangement of a folk song could be copy-
righted because it "differed in words and music from any version of it that has been proved, al-
though the theme was the same and the music quite similar").
1os 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
106 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212.
107 White-Smith, 209 U.S. at ii.
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melody which the composer has invented."108 The Court ultimately dis-
missed the case on the now-superseded ground that a musical work re-
corded in an exclusively machine-readable (rather than human-reada-
ble) format like a player-piano roll is not an infringing "copy."10 9 To be
sure, the Court's holding in White-Smith was based entirely on the me-
dium in which the defendant had fixed the copyrighted work and thus
technically made no law on what the work is. But even in setting up
the dispositive fixation issue, the Court's discussion of the work itself
tellingly dwelt on melody as a metonym for music.
Such rhetoric soon cashed out in influencing case outcomes. Shortly
after joining the bench in 1909, Judge Learned Hand echoed (though
did not cite) White-Smith's characterization of the musical work in his
decision in Hein v. Harris,1 0 an infringement case that squarely pre-
sented the question of how important melody is to a work's scope. Judge
Hand defined a musical composition as a "collocation of notes" and its
infringement as a "similarity [that] is substantially a copy, so that to the
ear of the average person the two melodies sound to be the same."1
Applying that definition, he instituted a test that would come to be
called his "comparative method."1 12 First, he would abstract out any
sense of rhythm by changing the time values of the defendant's notes to
match the plaintiff's (or else simply assigning equal time values to both);
then, he would transpose the defendant's work into the same key as the
plaintiff's work; and last, he would line up the two altered staves side
by side and measure the confluence of pitches.1 1 3 In Hein, this test led
Judge Hand to find infringement based on corresponding pitches in thir-
teen out of seventeen total bars.1 14
108 Id.
109 Id. at is.
110 175 F. 875 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 183 F. 107 (2d Cir. igi).
1I Id. at 877. The definition was a rare departure from the established rule, endorsed by virtu-
ally every other judge - including Judge Hand in later cases - that copyright infringement re-
quired not just excessive similarity but also actual copying. See Joseph P. Fishman, The Copy
Process, gi N.Y.U. L. REV. 855, 905 (2016).
112 See, e.g., ALFRED M. SHAFTER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 205 (2d ed. 1939) ("[T]he 'compar-
ative method,' worked out by Judge Learned Hand with great success, is most useful in deciding
where the melody itself is altered - but fundamentally the same as the one allegedly copied."); Paul
W. Orth, The Use of Expert Witnesses in Musical Infringement Cases, 16 U. PITT. L. REV. 232, 235
(1955) (discussing Judge Hand's "comparative method" and its "implicit recognition" of an "exag-
gerated importance of melody").
113 Orth, supra note 112, at 235; see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins of
the Copyright Infringement Analysis, 68 STAN. L. REV. 791, 822 (2016) (noting that Judge Hand's
music copyright opinions "often focused on the melodic component of a work, which he believed
endowed the work with its commercial and popular significance" and that "[c]onsequently, for cop-
ying to be actionable, the melody itself needed to be copied, regardless of how extensive other cop-
ying was").
114 175 F. at 876.
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When Congress began the copyright reform process that culminated
in the Copyright Act of 1909,115 it was heavily preoccupied with music,
thanks to White-Smith's erstwhile holding that player-piano rolls didn't
count as actionable copies. While Congress undid the rule about which
embodiments constitute copies,'1 6 its discussion of the copied music con-
tinued White-Smith's rhetorical focus on melodies. Early in the process,
the representative of the Music Publishers Association of the United
States entered into the Congressional Record an article that all but re-
gurgitated D'Almaine, invoking without citation its mantra that "[i]t is
the air, or melody, which is the invention of the author.""' Thorvald
Solberg, the first Register of Copyrights, likewise remarked at a hearing
that "the copyright in musical works" means "the melody or a theme.""
By the time the final legislative text was enacted, it granted the owner
of a musical-composition copyright the right "to make any arrangement
or setting of it or of the melody of it in any system of notation or any
form of record."11 9 Only that single element was isolated from the over-
all work for purposes of defining the owner's exclusive ability to repro-
duce it.
Under the 1909 Act, the trend continued. A popular treatise of the
day defined infringement of a musical work as an act of copying that
results in a scenario in which "the theme or melody of two musical works
is substantially the same."1 2 0 Judge Hand employed his comparative
method again to find infringement in Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc.,121 this time
drawing lines between identical pitches on an exhibit showing a "note-
by-note comparison of the melodies."12 2
In Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham,1 2 3 decided a few years later, Judge
Hand at least ventured beyond the primary melodic line - yet still re-
mained fixated on tallying notes elsewhere in the piece. The opinion led
off by declaring that "the plagiarism of any substantial component part,
115 Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).
116 See id. § i(e).
117 Hearings Before the Comms. on Patents of the S. and H.R., Conjointly, on the Bills S. 633o
& H.R. z9853, 5 9 th Cong. 243 (1906) (statement of George W Furniss, Special Committee on Cop-
yright of the Music Publishers' Association of the United States).
118 STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE CON-
FERENCE ON COPYRIGHT 104 (1905), reprinted in i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COP-
YRIGHT ACT pt. C, at 104 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976).
119 Copyright Act of igog § i(e) (emphasis added). The provision also enacted a compulsory
license - now found in section 115 of the current Copyright Act - that allowed second comers to
record their own arrangements of previously recorded works, commonly called cover versions. Id.
120 WILLIAM B. HALE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROP-
ERTY § 320 (1917).
121 234 F. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
122 See Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc. 234 F. io5 (S.D.N.Y 1916), MUSIC COPYRIGHT INFRINGE-
MENT RESOURCE, http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/igo-igig/Pages/haasleofeist.html [https://perma.cc/
USEJ-QQDA].
123 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
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either in melody or accompaniment," could support an infringement ac-
tion. 1 2 4 Under that standard, Judge Hand imposed liability based on
copying not a topline tune but a repeated accompaniment motif called
an ostinato.12 5 Nevertheless, the focus remained on a quantifiable se-
quence of pitches, albeit ones played to support a primary theme rather
than as part of that theme itself. For Judge Hand, the decision remained
consistent with his comparative method; the "substantial component
part" of which he wrote remained the notes, not their tonal quality or
their surrounding harmonic or rhythmic context.1 2 6 Whether he called
it a melody or an accompaniment, what Judge Hand cared about in a
music case was the pitches.127
While other judges weren't as punctilious note counters as Judge
Hand was, the results were similar. In Boosey v. Empire Music Co. ,128
for example, the court was tasked with comparing a plaintive English
love ballad and a Tin Pan Alley ragtime number about Tennessee. The
only similarity was the use of a six-note motif for the recurrent phrase
"I hear you calling me." 129 That was enough. The court decided that
the sequence of notes functioned as what we might today call the song's
hook, providing "the kind of sentiment in both cases that causes the
audiences to listen, applaud, and buy copies in the corridor on the way
out of the theater. " 1 3 0  Yet the court candidly acknowledged that its
judgment had little to do with market substitution. It was under no
illusion that the audience for one work would actually buy copies of the
other:
[T]he sale of defendant's composition cannot interfere with the sale of plain-
tiffs' composition by virtue of the inherent difference, generally speaking,
of the tastes to which they appeal, and therefore the case is not one where
plaintiffs' commercial exploitation of their composition is interfered with,
but one which involves solely the rights under the statute.131
To justify an infringement finding on the ground that rights were
violated is, of course, tautological. The real question is what could make
six notes a legally protectable unit. In Empire Music, the answer wasn't
economics. More likely, it was the aesthetic norm of nineteenth-century
124 Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
125 Id
126 Id
127 Judge Hand did suggest that notes beyond a topline melody were less important, concluding
that the copying was harmless in part because "the piece won its success substantially because of
the melody," id., and so awarding the minimum allowable damages, id. at 152.
128 224 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
129 See id. at 647 ("The two compositions are considerably different, both in theme and execution,
except as to this phrase, 'I hear you calling me,' and, as to that, there is a marked similarity."); Boosey
v. Empire Music 224 F 64 6 (S.D. N.Y 1915), MUSIC COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT RESOURCE,
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/i-g91o-igig/Pages/booseyempire.html [https://perma.cc/PR6N-HAUL].
130 Empire Music, 224 F. at 647.
131 Id.
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European art music, along with its judicial mouthpieces D'Almaine and
Jollie: melody is the locus of genuine musical creativity.
The clearest articulation of this principle came a few decades later
in Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distributing Co. 1 3 2 The court
began its discussion by positing that the frontier of musical innovation
had essentially closed for all but melody. The supply of fresh rhythms
(which the court conflated with tempo) had been "long since exhausted,"
leaving originality in the domain "a rarity, if not an impossibility."1 3 3
Likewise, harmony "is achieved according to rules which have been
known for many years."13 4  The result, according to the court, was a
categorical exclusion of these elements, for "[b]eing in the public domain
for so long neither rhythm nor harmony can in itself be the subject of
copyright."1 3 5  Melody is all that remains, and it is melody alone that
would provide the musical work its ontological status: "It is in the mel-
ody of the composition - or the arrangement of notes or tones that
originality must be found. It is the arrangement or succession of musical
notes, which are the finger prints of the composition, and establish its
identity."13 6
This is a striking statement. Confusion over how to define copy-
right's central unit of measurement - the work - is one of the most
familiar sources of anxiety in the field. 1 3  And yet here the answer, at
least for musical works, is presented with elegant simplicity. The musi-
cal work is the melody - no more, no less.1 3 8
132 105 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
133 Id. at 400.
134 Id.
135 Id. At least one commentator has explicitly endorsed this categorical view. See Sherman,
supra note 5, at 12 6 ("It has been said that originality in rhythm is an impossibility, and this view is
probably correct." (footnote omitted)).
136 N. Music, IO F. Supp. at 400.
137 See, e.g., H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 158 (Comm. Print 1964) (testimony of Barbara Ringer that "courts have
struggled mightily with this rather common problem, and have not really come up with a satisfac-
tory result"); Paul Goldstein, Melville B. Nimmer Memorial Lecture, What Is a Copyrighted Work?
Why Does It Matter?, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1175, 1175 (2011) (noting that the Copyright Act "extends
its protection to 'original works of authorship,' [but] nowhere in fact delimits the metes and bounds
of a copyrighted work, or even prescribes a methodology for locating a work's boundaries" (quoting
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012))); Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 576 (2005) ("American copyright law is an enormous legal structure, full
of defined terms, all built on one completely undefined term: the 'work.' . . . But the law runs silent
on the foundational concept on which these definitions are built.").
138 Northern Music has provoked occasional frustration. See, e.g., Brauneis, supra note 5o, at
17-18 (criticizing Northern Music for "fail[ing] to recognize that copyright protects a musical work
as a whole," id. at 17, and that a combination of individually unprotectable elements may itself be
protected); Orth, supra note 112, at 234-35 (arguing that Northern Music "is inaccurate musically,
and may well beg the consideration that melodies are often best disguised by using harmonies and
rhythms, even old ones, to achieve a seemingly 'original' combination"); Aaron Keyt, Comment, An
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B. The Emergence of Multidimensional Similarity
In the time since the passage of the current Copyright Act in 1976,
the picture has gotten hazier. It's not that the statute has added new
information about what a musical work is. Because Congress believed
that the term had a "fairly settled meaning[],"1 3 9 the 1976 Act, like its
predecessors, does not define it.140 The Act provides only that musical
works - whatever they may be - are protectable works of author-
ship.14 1 Music, like other works, continues to receive seemingly open-
ended protection against the copying of any amount of expression that
is deemed sufficiently substantial.1 4 2 The 1976 Act also retains the 1909
Act's narrow requirement of melodic consistency in cover versions of
songs,1 4 3 allowing artists to avail themselves of the compulsory license
even when modifying the musical arrangement "to conform it to the
style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved," just so
long as it does not "change the basic melody or fundamental character
of the work." 1 4 4
Instead, the uncertainty is coming from the courts. On the one hand,
some judicial decisions continue the pattern set over the previous cen-
tury, from the German publishers' agreements to Northern Music's dec-
laration that elder generations had already devoured all the original
rhythms and harmonies. Music industry norms, too, reflect that pattern
today, showing less tolerance for borrowings of melody than of other
elements.1 4 5 On the other hand, decisions expanding the scope of music
infringement liability have slowly accrued, punctuated by the "Blurred
Lines" decision. The upshot is growing confusion over what can be
copied and what cannot.
i. Cases Retaining the Traditional Approach. - In terms of case
law, one can still find support for the proposition that melody is king.
Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism Litigation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 421, 431 (1988) ("If only
melody can be original, if melody is the sole measure of a work's identity, no change which the
defendant makes in harmony or rhythm could possibly matter. In the eyes of the law, such changes
would be as irrelevant as changing the color of the paper in [a] hypothetical photocopier." (footnote
omitted)).
139 H.R. REP No. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667.
140 See i U.S.C. § ii (defining various categories of copyrightable subject matter, including
architectural works, audiovisual works, and literary works - but not musical works).
141 Id. § 102(a)(2).
142 H.R. REP No. 94-1476, at 61-62; S. REP No. 94-473, at 58 (1975) ("As under the present law,
a copyrighted work would be infringed by reproducing it in whole or in any substantial part, and
by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or simulation. Wide departures or variations from the
copyrighted works would still be an infringement as long as the author's 'expression' rather than
merely [the author's] ideas are taken.").
143 See supra note 119.
144 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2).
145 See supra p. 1873.
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To be sure, not many infringement decisions in recent decades have ex-
pressly excluded nonmelodic elements as Northern Music did, though a
few have done so.1 4 6  Even so, sometimes the takeaway amounts to
something similar. In Newton v. Diamond,1 47 the Ninth Circuit decided
2-I that the Beastie Boys could not be held liable for sampling a short
phrase from a composition by jazz flutist James Newton.1 48 The sepa-
rate copyright in Newton's sound recording was not at issue, leaving the
court to determine only the scope of the musical work that was embod-
ied within it.149 As displayed below in Figure I, Newton's score in-
structed the performer to sing the notes C, D-flat, and then back to C
again while also simultaneously playing a held C on the flute.1 5 0 In the
sampled recording, Newton performed the phrase by overblowing the
single flute note "in such a way as to emphasize the upper partials of the
flute's complex harmonic tone, [although] such a modification of tone
color is not explicitly requested in the score."1 5 1 The result was a dis-
tinctive timbre, a sequence whose pitches were perfectly commonplace
but whose tonal quality was anything but. The court concluded that
this timbre was merely "the product of Newton's highly developed per-
formance techniques, rather than the result of a generic rendition of the
composition" - and therefore not part of the musical work copyright.1 5 2
Once shorn of the timbral characteristics that made the sampled music
even remotely interesting, the three-note phrase presented an easy case
of de minimis use. 153
146 See Siskind v. Newton-John, No. 84 Civ. 2634, 1987 WL 11701, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1987)
(citing Northern Music for the proposition that "it is the melody which is the most important feature
of the music" and therefore finding no infringement based on a lack of melodic similarity); MCA,
Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443, 450 & n.g, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding infringement based on a
confluence of successive pitches and quoting with approval Northern Music's passage about melody
being the composition's "fingerprints," id. at 450 n.g); see also Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3 d 12, 23-
24 (ist Cir. 2005) (holding that a particular harmonic progression was not copyrightable and quoting
with seeming approval Northern Music's categorical exclusion of harmonic originality, although
acknowledging that "there may be some circumstances in which a common harmonic progression
could be exploited in an original (and, thus, protectable) manner," id. at 23); Cronin, supra note 2,
at 192-93 (noting contemporary examples of litigants continuing to employ Judge Hand's method
of melodic comparison).
147 388 F.3d 1189 (gth Cir. 2004).
148 Id. at 1190.
149 See id.
15o Id. at Iig.
151 Id. at 1194 (alteration in original) (quoting expert testimony).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 1196-97.
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Figure i: Score from Newton v. Diamond1 5 4
For my purposes here, I need not quibble with the ultimate judgment
of noninfringement. But the court's rationale underlying that judgment
betrays the same narrow definition of the musical work that motivated
the earlier decisions discussed in the previous subsection. Professor
Olufunmilayo Arewa has argued that this case reveals judges' "[v]isual
bias"5 in music copyright disputes - gravitating toward the some-
times-sparse markings on the score rather than the fulsome aural ex-
pression through which most audiences experience the piece. 1 5 6 I agree
that courts are susceptible to such biases and that Newton is a good
example of it. 15 There is yet another problem, however, with the ma-
jority's analysis. The score arguably (at least arguably enough to sur-
vive summary judgment) instructs he very realization that the majority
ascribed purely to the performer's interpretive choice. As the dissent
emphasized in seizing on the explanation of one of Newton's experts,
"the special playing technique described in the score (holding one fin-
gered note constant while singing the other pitches) and the resultant
154 Id. at IIgg (appendix).
155 Arewa, supra note 47, at 481.
156 See id. at 502-05.
157 For an even more recent and higher-profile example, consider the lawsuit against Led
Zeppelin over the opening riff of "Stairway to Heaven." See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. CV
15-3462, 2016 WL 1442461, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016) (finding that plaintiff's experts assessing
the similarity between musical works "impermissibly relied on performance elements" that were
"beyond the scope of the musical composition," including "fingerpicking style," use of an acoustic
guitar, flute, strings, and harpsichord; use of "atmospheric sustained pads"; and the "music produc-
tion and mixing process").
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complex, expressive effect that results" shows "that the 'unique expres-
sion' of this excerpt is not solely in the pitch choices, but is actually in
those particular pitches performed in that particular way on that instru-
ment."s1 5  Thus, in the dissent's view, "the 'playing technique' is not a
matter of personal performance, but is a built-in feature of the score
itself."15 9
The majority did not, in fact, straightforwardly apply a rule that the
composition is limited to the notation on the page.16 0 It first needed to
evaluate how much was actually on the page to begin with. Part of
what may have driven the majority to filter out timbre and instrumen-
tation in spite of the score is the background belief that the tune is the
text. Everything else is its interpretation. Indeed, one subsequent deci-
sion has followed Newton's lead in allocating timbral creativity to per-
formance rather than to composition even without a written score to fall
back on. 16 1
2. Cases Promoting a Broader Approach. - At the same time, how-
ever, another set of recent cases have quietly chipped away at the doc-
trinal wall around melody. The first change came in Tempo Music, Inc.
v. Famous Music Corp.1 6 2 The case concerned the copyrightability of
harmonies that Duke Ellington's frequent collaborator Billy Strayhorn
composed for the jazz song "Satin Doll."1 63  Ellington's estate, which
stood to retain a larger royalty share if Strayhorn's estate had no copy-
right interest in the harmony, argued right out of the Northern Music
playbook that "harmony can never be the subject of copyright"1 64 be-
cause it "is in the common musical vocabulary; only the melody and
structure are distinctively original."1 6 5 But breaking from the old view
that music consists first of melodic originality and afterward only of
mere mechanics,16 6 the court determined that "[w]hile . . . melody gen-
erally implies a limited range of chords which can accompany it, a com-
158 Newton, 388 F.3 d at 1198 (Graber, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting expert testimony
(emphasis added)).
159 Id. (quoting expert testimony).
160 Arguably, the majority even departed from such a rule. See Brauneis, supra note 5o, at 37
(arguing that the Newton dissent "may be more purely following the notation approach, acknowl-
edging that written notation often includes special directions that shape timbre and not just pitches
and duration").
161 See Poindexter v. EMI Record Grp., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 559, 2012 WL 1027639, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 27, 2012).
162 838 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
163 Id. at 164.
164 Id. at -68.
165 Id. (quoting Ellington's memo). That anyone would take this position in the name of
Ellington, one ofjazz's great harmonic innovators, is deeply ironic. See infra section IIA, pp. 1897-
1901.
166 See supra pp. 1878-79.
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poser may exercise creativity in selecting among these chords. . . Cre-
ating a harmony may, but need not, be merely a mechanical by-product
of melody."167 It rejected the contrary reasoning of Northern Music, a
decision from the same court, as unpersuasive dicta.168
Tempo Music, though, was a copyrightability case, asking only
whether the creator of a particular artistic element within a work met
copyright's threshold of authorship. What about the infringement side
of the equation - could a second comer be liable for copying part of a
musical work other than its tune (or lyrics)? Increasingly, courts are
answering yes. In BMS Entertainment/Heat Music LLC v. Bridges,1 6 9
for example, the court refused to dismiss an infringement claim against
hip-hop artists Ludacris and Kanye West for allegedly copying a refrain
that combined: (a) "a call-and-response format"; (b) "the lyrics 'like that'
preceded by a one-syllable word" ("just like that" in one song and
"straight like that" in the other); and (c) a rhythmic pattern of an eighth
note, quarter note, and eighth note.170 Recognizing that each of these
elements might have been unprotectable standing alone, the court nev-
ertheless invoked the bedrock copyright principle that "unoriginal ele-
ments, when combined, may constitute an original, copyrightable
work."" Like the "Blurred Lines" litigation a decade later, the case
would only be resolved after a high-profile trial against celebrity defend-
ants; unlike in that litigation, however, the alleged infringers won.17 2
A similar emphasis on rhythm and tone quality drove the Sixth
Circuit to uphold an infringement verdict in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
UMG Recordings, Inc.1 3 That case turned on the defendants' use of
samples from the George Clinton funk song "Atomic Dog."1 7 4 The rel-
evant copyright was in the musical composition, rather than in the
sound recording, but the court collapsed the distinction.1 5 It concluded
that Clinton's "repetition of the word 'dog' in a low tone of voice at
regular intervals and the sound of rhythmic panting"' 6 were integral
elements of the musical work.17 The jury thus properly considered
them in finding that the defendants had infringed.
167 Tempo Music, 838 F. Supp. at 168.
168 Id. at -69.
169 No. 04 Civ. 2584, 2005 WL 1593013 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2005).
170 Id. at *5.
171 Id. at *3 (citing Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1004 (2d Cir. 1995)).
172 See Kanye, Ludacris Prevail in Copyright Case, BILLBOARD (June 2, 2006), http://www.billboard.
com/articles/news/58252/kanye-ludacris-prevail-in-copyright-case [https://perma.cc/Z834-6HEV].
173 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009).
174 Id. at 272.
175 See id. at 276 ("[T]he song was composed and recorded in the studio simultaneously and,
therefore, ... the composition was embedded in the sound recording.").
176 Id. at 272.
177 Id. at 275.
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Arguably the most expansive definition of the musical work so far
arrived in the 2015 decision New Old Music Group, Inc. v. Gottwald.",,
The court there concluded that a work could infringe merely by copying
a work's percussion, entirely independent of the melodies and harmonies
surrounding it.179 The dispute hinged on a claim "based solely on the
drum set part of [the allegedly copied work], and not on the parts played
by any other instruments," meaning that there were "no other harmonic,
melodic or lyrical similarities" between them.1 0 The court denied the
defendants' summary judgment motion based on an original combina-
tion of elements within the drum pattern, which in the court's estimation
could "reasonably be described as the driving groove, or backbone, of
the song."8
The defendants had argued that the percussion pattern was preva-
lent within the genre. That prevalence, they stressed, undermined any
inference of actual copying and, moreover, rendered any material that
might have been copied freely appropriable anyway under copyright's
sctnes d faire doctrine.18 2 The representative examples that they sub-
mitted each bore fine-grained differences from the plaintiff's work, such
as use of a tambourine or open hi-hat instead of a closed hi-hat.1 3 The
defendants contended - understandably, given the history of music
copyright - that "a composition does not change based upon the instru-
ment which performs it."1184 The court disagreed, however. Citing dicta
from a prior infringement case that had been decided based on garden-
variety melodic content, the court determined that "instrumentation
is ... a compositional component to a musical work."18 5 That conclu-
sion meant that the plaintiff's particular percussion choices were origi-
nal enough, and the defendants' alleged copying substantial enough, to
merit a trial.
178 122 F. Supp. 3 d 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
179 Id. at 98.
180 Id. at 83.
181 Id. at 97.
182 Id. at 86, 95. Under that doctrine, "a copyright owner can't prove infringement by pointing
to features of his work that are found in the defendant's work as well but that are so rudimentary,
commonplace, standard, or unavoidable that they do not serve to distinguish one work within a
class of works from another." Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., LLP, 329 F.3 d 923, 929 (7th
Cir. 2003).
183 New Old Music, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 87-88.
184 Id. at 87 (quoting Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment at ii, New Old Music, 122 F. Supp. 3d 78 (No. 13-cv-ogo'3), ECF No. 69
(emphasis omitted)).
185 Id. at 88 (citing Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2004), for the proposition that




Together, Bridgeport and New Old Music explode the division that
Newton erects between the musical work and its performative realiza-
tion. Substantial-similarity doctrine prevents copying "the heart" of the
work; 6 one can no longer assume that the heart is to be found in a
sequence of pitches. The legal terrain is now fertile for claims focusing
elsewhere. Unsurprisingly, copyright owners have begun to make them,
filing multiple complaints that test the definition of music infringe-
ment." One legal news outlet declared 2016 "The Year the Music
Sued.""
That disappearing boundary doubly constrains downstream compos-
ers. First, it expands the set of choices that a predecessor can make to
transform the common and unprotected into the uncommon and pro-
tected. (Think you're just copying a stock rhythm? If it's packaged
within an original orchestration, you may be infringing.) Second, sur-
rounding that rhythm with an entirely different melody - what law
had for so long considered to be the site of a musical work's identity -
may still yield a substantially similar composition. One cannot rely on
melodic dissimilarity as a safe harbor.
This shift is still unsettled enough that courts may wind up shoe-
horning elements into the familiar melody box even when they don't
really belong there. When two songwriters sued musicians Usher and
Justin Bieber for plagiarizing the song "Somebody to Love" in their iden-
tically titled hit, the plaintiffs alleged a wide range of similarities but
conspicuously left out the melody.18 9 Realistically, they couldn't have
included it, as the melodies had little in common.190 The defendants
186 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1985) (quot-
ing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983));
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat'1 Broad. Co., 482 F. SUpp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that copying a
quantitatively small portion of a musical work could support an infringement finding if that portion
was "the heart of the composition"), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 980).
187 See, e.g., Complaint for Copyright Infringement ¶¶ 20, 32, Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 17-cv-
05221 (S.D.N.Y. July II, 2017) (alleging infringement over copying a "bass line and drum composi-
tion," id. ¶ 20); Complaint for Damages ¶ 66, Yours, Mine & Ours Music v. Sony Music Entm't,
No. i6-cv-8056 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2016) (alleging infringement over copying the "main instrumental
attributes and themes," such as "the distinct funky specifically noted and timed consistent guitar
riffs present hroughout the compositions, virtually if not identical bass notes and sequence, rhythm,
structure, crescendo of horns and synthesizers"); Plaintiff's Complaint for: Copyright Infringement
¶¶ 14-16, Miller v. Lovato, No. 16-cv-o6272 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) (alleging infringement over
copying a combination of hand claps and bass drum rhythms, along with "sonic qualities" such as
signal decay); Complaint ¶¶ 68-69, Dienel v. Warner-Tamerlane Publ'g Corp., No. 16-cv-oo978
(M.D. Tenn. May 25, 2016) (alleging infringement over copying a vocal timbre that is "inextricably
linked" to the plaintiff's composition, id. ¶ 68, and "the seed from which the entire song grows," id.
¶ 69).
188 Bill Donahue, 2016. The Year the Music Sued, LAW36o (Jan. 13, 2017, 5:o6 PM), https://
www.law36o.com/articles/88o127/2016-the-year-the-music-sued [https://perma.cc/VHW5-KEgP].
189 Complaint 1 47, Copeland v. Bieber, No. 13-cV-246 (E.D. Va. Mar. 28, 2014).
190 See Charles Cronin, Devin Copeland v. Justin Bieber, et al., 789 F. 3d 484 (4 th Cir 2015),
MUSIC COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT RESOURCE, http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/2010-2019/Pages/
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predictably pounced on this omission, arguing that "melody is para-
mount" and quoting Northern Music's infamous passage.1 91 The dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) without much
discussion.19 2 On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit vacated and re-
manded after reaching the opposite conclusion.1 9 3  The appeals court
acknowledged that the songs belonged to different genres (R&B versus
dance pop/electronica, in the court's taxonomy)1 9 4 and that "numerically,
the points of dissimilarity may well exceed the points of similarity."1 9 5
Nevertheless, it concluded - without the benefit of expert evidence -
that a reasonable jury could still find substantial similarity based on the
songs' choruses, in which the eponymous line "somebody to love" is sung
to what the court characterized as "a strikingly similar melody."1 9 6
The court hedged on this last point, noting that "it sounds as though
there are a couple of points in the respective chorus melodies where the
Bieber and Usher songs go up a note and the Copeland song goes down
a note, or vice versa," but determined that a jury could look past these
contrasts. 197
Yet melody can't be doing the work that the court assigns to it -
the notes simply don't line up in a meaningful way.198 So if not melody,
what really motivated the Fourth Circuit? My guess (and one can't do
much more than guess, given the scant explanation in the opinion) is
that the answer lies in the close of the opinion, where the court noted
that in both works "the singing of the titular lyric is an anthemic, sing-
along moment, delivered at a high volume and pitch."199 That is, the
real similarity is the use of the same few words and the same dynamics
at the same spot in the song in order to create a memorable tune, albeit
a tune with different notes. But that's not the mode of analysis that
music infringement cases usually follow. Historically, they examine mel-
odies, a fact the court amply demonstrated when it cited to a string of
copelandvbieber.html [https://perma.cc/4WAR-6TQR] ("The pitch sequences of the settings, despite
the fact that they are both minimal and unoriginal, are dissimilar. Copeland's starts on the 'home'
pitch, rises by a fifth and resolves a fourth above home whereas Bieber's begins a third above home,
rises a second, and resolves to home.").
191 See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Universal Music Corp. and Def Jam Music Group
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Failure to State a Claim as a Matter of Law at :o,
Copeland, No. 13-cv-246, ECF No. '8.
192 See Copeland, 2014 WL 10935943, at *6 (finding no substantial similarity as a matter of law
because the two songs' "mood, tone, and subject matter differ significantly").
193 Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 487 (4th Cir. 2015).
194 Id. at 492.
195 Id. at 493.
196 Id. at 494.
197 Id.
198 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
199 Copeland, 789 F.3d at 495.
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cases that assessed similarity by tallying pitches. 2 0 0 The court suggested
that it was doing the same thing, even when it wasn't.
Where we're left today is in a state of uncertainty over what kinds
of musical borrowing can count as infringement. Without a normative
framework for assessing how law should define the musical work, that
uncertainty is likely to persist. If law is going to regulate a res that it
calls music - and it's going to - then it needs a better idea of what the
definition is supposed to do.
II. THE AESTHETICS AND ECONOMICS OF MELODY
As it happens, law isn't the only field that has struggled to nail down
the ontology of the musical work. Judges have stepped, likely without
knowledge and certainly without acknowledgement, into a long-running
debate between philosophers.2 0 1 One camp, sometimes called the pure
sonicists, posits that the work is constituted by its melody, rhythm, and
harmony, which are the features that structurally organize the work's
note relationships.2 0 2  Timbre and orchestration, pleasurable as they
may be to the listener, do not subsist in the work as essential qualities.
Thus, on this theory, Bach's Well-Tempered Clavier would remain the
same piece whether performed on a piano, a harpsichord, or a wood-
wind quartet,203 and one of its fugues would remain the same fugue even
if played on a choir of kazoos.20 4 Another camp, sometimes called tim-
bral sonicists, insist that simply getting the right pitches in the right
order isn't enough; there also needs to be the right tone quality.2 0 5
200 Id. at 493-94.
201 For an overview, see generally Andrew Kania, The Philosophy of Music § 2, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2017 ed.), https://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/music/ [https://perma.cc/gG5C-38MF].
202 Id. A forceful proponent of this view is Professor Roger Scruton, who argues that "[iln de-
scribing the timbre of a tone we are not situating it in musical space; nor are we identifying anything
that is essential to it as a musical individual. This is why orchestrations, reductions, and so on are,
as a rule, heard as versions of a piece, rather than as new musical entities." ROGER SCRUTON,
THE AESTHETICS OF MUSIC 77 (1997); see also William E. Webster, A Theory of the Composi-
tional Work of Music, 33 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 59, 60-62 (1974).
203 SCRUTON, supra note 202, at 442.
204 Peter Kivy, Orchestrating Platonism, in AESTHETIC DISTINCTION 42, 55 (T. Anderberg et
al. eds., 1988).
205 See, e.g., Julian Dodd, Sounds, Instruments, and Works of Music, in PHILOSOPHERS ON
MUSIC 23, 27-31 (Kathleen Stock ed., 2007). Though it's beyond my scope here, an even more
rigorous test for identity between two works has been offered by instrumentalists (a term with a
rather different meaning in this context than it has when applied to, say, Justice Holmes). These
analysts demand a match not only between timbres but also between the performance means
through which they are produced. A harpsichord sonata played on a synthesizer that perfectly
recreates a harpsichord sound is not the same work as the sonata played on a real harpsichord. See
JERROLD LEVINSON, MUSIC, ART, AND METAPHYSICS 395 (2d ed. 2011) ("Part of the expressive
character of a piece of music as heard derives from our sense of how it is being made in performance,
and our correlation of that with its sonic aspect - its sound - narrowly speaking; and its expressive
11892 [Vol. r31:i86i
MUSIC AS A MATTER OF LAW
Throughout much of its history, copyright law has seemingly adopted
a fragmented version of pure sonicism. The musical work as legal object
amounts not even to a combination of melody, rhythm, and harmony,
but more narrowly to melody in particular. The work reduces to a se-
quence of pitches that play out over time, even if divorced from those
pitches' harmonic and rhythmic context.2 0 6 On the other hand, when a
more recent decision like New Old Music parses between closed hi-hats
and open hi-hats performing the same rhythm, law is adopting an
equally fragmented version of timbral sonicism. On that theory, the
sounds that matter are the rhythmic beats in what we perceive to be an
authentic timbral context, whether or not they are in what we perceive
to be an authentic melodic context.
I mention this divide not because I expect that philosophical jargon
is going to pave the way out of copyright's definitional mess. In fact,
if a judge ever mentions "timbral sonicism" in support of a decision,
something has surely gone wrong. But at least the philosophers
acknowledge that they are choosing sides on a contestable issue of aes-
thetics. Judicial opinions don't. Musicologist Joanna Demers captures
the phenomenon well when she describes copyright law as constructing
an implicit "hierarchy within the musical work" like something out of
Aristotle, distinguishing between the "essential" substance of melody
and the "accidental" ones of harmony, rhythm, and timbre.2 07
That courts have partaken in that hierarchizing for so long is puz-
zling. This is not how copyright usually works. To establish infringe-
ment, courts have long obligated plaintiffs to show "substantial similar-
ity" between the accused and protected work.2 08  That requirement,
which kicks in only after it has been shown that the defendant copied
something from the plaintiff, is essentially a judge-made materiality
character tout court is partly a function of how it properly sounds taken in conjunction with how
that sound is meant to be produced in performance.").
206 See, e.g., Boosey v. Empire Music Co., 224 F. 646, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
207 Demers, supra note 5, at 310.
208 See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) ("[T]he question
is whether the part so taken is 'substantial."' (quoting Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F. 959, 960 (2d
Cir. 1923))); 3 PATRY, supra note 50, § 9:59 ("For copying to constitute infringement, a defendant
must have reproduced a material amount of the plaintiffs [sic] expression, or as i frequently stated,
the parties' works must be 'substantially similar."'). For early statements of this part of the in-
fringement standard, see Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 676 (1879) (stating that in order to infringe
the reproduction right, "a substantial copy of the whole or of a material part must be produced");
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (explaining that infringement
occurs "[i]f so much is taken, that ... the labors of the original author are substantially to an inju-
rious extent appropriated by another").
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threshold in all infringement actions.2 0 9 And so long as the copied ex-
pression is qualitatively material within the protected work, even a frag-
ment will do.2 1 0
In nonmusic cases, there are multiple elements of any given work
that can cross that threshold. In the visual arts, for example, there is no
single component of a work that exerts a gravitational pull on the in-
fringement analysis. As Judge Hand explained in a 1960 case over fab-
ric designs, "no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone
beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions
must therefore inevitably be ad hoc."2 1 1 Factfinders, he wrote, should
simply consult the works' "overall appearance."2 1 2 This refusal to single
out a dominant element is especially noteworthy coming from the same
judge who preferred to approach music cases by carving up works into
abstract sequences of pitches.2 13
And so it continues today. Recent case law has explained that:
[T]he defendant may infringe on the plaintiff's [visual] work not only
through literal copying of a portion of it, but also by parroting properties
that are apparent only when numerous aesthetic decisions embodied in the
plaintiff's work of art - the excerpting, modifying, and arranging of public
domain compositions, if any, together with the development and represen-
tation of wholly new motifs and the use of texture and color, etc. - are
considered in relation to one another.2 14
The decision in which this quote appears found infringement for
copying the selective omission of visual motifs from a public domain
design.215  Another decision found infringement for copying the color
209 See EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL
PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 409 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1879) (stating that the substantial-similarity inquiry "is equally applicable to maps, charts, pictorial
productions, musical compositions, and in short all things which are the subjects of copyright"); 3
PATRY, supra note 50, § 9:5 9; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright
Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203, 206 (2012) (explaining that substantial-similarity doctrine "places the bur-
den to establish that the defendant's copying is actionable as a legal proposition on the plaintiff in
a copyright-infringement suit, even when the copying is shown to exist as a factual matter").
210 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1985) (find-
ing that a work was infringing because it "qualitatively embodied" the protected work's "distinctive
expression," id. at 565, despite the fact that, "[iln absolute terms, the words actually quoted were an
insubstantial portion" of the protected work, id. at 564). The doctrine goes back a long way. See,
e.g., Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497) ("The infringement of
a copyright does not depend so much upon the length of the extracts as upon their value."); Gray v.
Russell, i0 F. Cas. 1035, 1038 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728) ("[T]he question may naturally turn
upon the point, not so much of the quantity, as of the value of the selected materials.").
211 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. i96o).
212 Id. In that case, the court based its infringement holding on similarities in colors, shapes, and
patterns. Id.
213 See supra pp. 1880-82 (discussing Judge Hand's comparative method).
214 Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2003).
215 Id. at 136.
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scheme of the letters on an alphabet quilt.2 1 6  In another, it was for
making a greeting card by copying a rough amalgamation of "the char-
acters depicted in the art work, the mood they portrayed, the combina-
tion of art work conveying a particular mood with a particular message,
and the arrangement of the words."217 And in yet another, it was (among
other things) for copying well-worn subject matter using the same
"sketchy, whimsical style" as the original artist.2 18  One cannot review
these cases and come away with a rule that courts will focus on a par-
ticular visual element. A given case might turn on form, color, space, or
the intersection of any of the above.
Theatrical works are subject to a similarly multidimensional in-
fringement analysis. Over a century ago, courts began finding infringe-
ment based on copying not just dialogue but also wordless dramatic
action.2 19 One could infringe the copyright in a novel or a film not just
by copying its literal words, but also by copying details from its plot,2 2 0
216 Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 273-74 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Knitwaves, Inc. v.
Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1004 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding infringement of a sweater design due to
copying a combination of "(i) selecting leaves and squirrels as its dominant design elements; (2)
coordinating these design elements with a 'fall' palette of colors and with a 'shadow-striped' . . . or
a four-paneled . .. background; and (3) arranging all the design elements and colors into an original
pattern for each sweater"); Malden Mills, Inc. v. Regency Mills, Inc., 626 F.2d 1112, 1113 (2d Cir.
i98o) (finding the depiction of two nature scenes substantially similar due to common coloring,
"shading, composition, relative size and placement of components, and mood").
217 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d iio6, inn0 (9th Cir. 1970).
218 Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 7o6, 712-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The
case concerned the famous cover of the New Yorker magazine that portrayed "a parochial New
Yorker's view of the world" in which Manhattan is larger than the rest of the planet. Id. at 709.
219 Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 61 (1911) ("Action can tell a story, display all the
most vivid relations between men, and depict every kind of human emotion, without the aid of a
word."); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[A] play may
be pirated without using the dialogue. . .. Speech is only a small part of a dramatist's means of
expression; he draws on all the arts and compounds his play from words and gestures and scenery
and costume and from the very looks of the actors themselves." Id. at 55.); Daly v. Palmer, 6 F.
Cas. 1132, 1138 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552) ("[I1t is a piracy, if the appropriated series of events,
when represented on the stage, although performed by new and different characters, using different
language, is recognized by the spectator, through any of the senses to which the representation is
addressed, as conveying substantially the same impressions to, and exciting the same emotions in,
the mind, in the same sequence or order.").
220 See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990) (cataloging various plot sim-
ilarities and concluding that "[e]ven if none of these plot elements is remarkably unusual in and of
itself, the fact that both scripts contain all of these similar events gives rise to a triable question of
substantial similarity of protected expression"); Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 55 (finding infringement based
on a common "sequence of the confluents" in the two works' plots).
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its fictionalized setting,2 21 or its characters.222 Thanks to a series of re-
cent judicial decisions, one could add to the list even a work's distinctive
inanimate objects.223 For films, cinematographic effects and visual de-
tails get tacked on too.22 4
To be sure, the infringement frameworks for these various fields
weren't born this way. Over time, they've come to protect smaller and
smaller chunks of expression.225 On one level, then, courts' increasingly
sensitive trigger finger for finding music infringement fits a general nar-
rative about expanding copyright scope across the board. Yet music still
remains an outlier. For other subject matter, that shift occurred nearly
a century ago, while for music many seem to expect to find the same
scope that courts were using in the early nineteenth century. Measured
against the baseline of infringement in other expressive media, the no-
tion that music cases should focus on only a single compositional ele-
ment is strikingly anachronistic.
Courts and commentators tend to offer several explanations for this
unusually singular focus. Some focus on the composer seeking copyright
protection, others on the audience. None is fully convincing.
221 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., 479 F. Supp. 351, 356 (N.D.
Ga. 1979); Steven D. Jamar & Christen B'anca Glenn, Essay, When the Author Owns the World:
Copyright Issues Arising from Monetizing Fan Fiction, i TEX. A&M L. REV. 959, 966 (2014) ("Cre-
ating a completely imaginary world 'in a galaxy far, far away' in a setting long, long ago might be
protected, if it is sufficiently well-drawn to distinguish it from every other world or universe." (foot-
note omitted)).
222 See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 752-54 (9th Cir. 1978); Warner Bros.
Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 948-49 (9 th Cir. 1954); Detective Comics, Inc. v.
Bruns Publ'ns, Inc., iii F.2d 432, 433-34 (2d Cir. 1940); Lone Wolf McQuade Assocs. v. CBS, Inc.,
961 F. Supp. 587, 594-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296-97 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
223 See, e.g., DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3 d 1012, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that the
Batmobile is independently copyrightable as an anthropomorphized literary character); New Line
Cinema Corp. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 161 F. Supp. 2d 293, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (recognizing a copy-
right in Freddie Krueger's glove because it was a "component part of the character which signifi-
cantly aids in identifying the character" (quoting New Line Cinema Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc.,
17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1631, 1633 (E.D.N.Y. 1989))).
224 See Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that a jury
could find substantial similarity between two commercials based on common uses of silence and
black backgrounds with white lettering in several scenes); Chuck Blore & Don Richman, Inc. v.
20/20 Advert. Inc., 674 F. Supp. 671, 678 (D. Minn. 1987) (extending protection in an audiovisual
work to "the rapid-edit style and use of close-ups inherent in the visual style and tone"); see also
Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 61o, 620 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding
two video games to be substantially similar audiovisual works based on their shared treatment of
a "gobbler" and "ghost monsters," id. at 6io).
225 Thomas F. Cotter, Transformative Use and Cognizable Harm, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
701, 728-29 (2010) ("Until changes began to take hold in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, courts
generally construed the copyright owner's rights ... to cover only verbatim or near-verbatim copy-
ing of a work, substantially in its entirety. Over time, however, the scope of the reproduction right
has expanded to the point where copying even relatively small fragments of expression, or such
nonliteral elements as plot and characters, can constitute a violation of the reproduction right.").
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A. Value Judgments
The justification with both the longest pedigree and the least con-
temporary relevance is that melody is uniquely significant to a work's
value, either as art or as commodity. As discussed above in Part I, this
view goes back to D'Almaine and its particular cultural backdrop.2 2 6
The defendant there made arguments that evoke two of the factors from
the modern fair use test: the transformativeness of the use and the ab-
sence of market harm.2 27 First, the defendant contended, his translation
of the owner's opera from a high-minded opus into lighter dance accom-
paniment required "a very considerable degree of musical skill and tal-
ent."2 28 Second, that translation rendered the accused copies poor eco-
nomic substitutes for the original opera.2 2 9
In rejecting each argument, the court made an enduring normative
judgment concerning music's value to both consumers and critics. Ac-
cording to the court, it was the tune that drove purchasing decisions in
the marketplace. By appropriating it, the arranger had taken "such as
made that work most saleable."2 3 0 Moreover, the court continued, the
arranger's creative contribution was negligible. Creating a tune meant
that you were making a real "invention," the "whole meritorious part"
of a work that "require[d] the aid of genius for its construction."2 3 1 Cre-
ating a setting in which to embed that tune meant that you were autho-
rial chopped liver.2 3 2
This analysis anticipates the familiar substantial-similarity test that
Judge Frank would establish a century later in the landmark case of
Arnstein v. Porter.2 33  That test asks "whether defendant ook from
plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners,
who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed,
that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the
plaintiff." 23 4 And what is pleasing to the ears, according to D'Almaine,
226 D'Almaine v. Boosey (1835) i6o Eng. Rep. 117 (Ex.).
227 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
228 D'Almaine, i6o Eng. Rep. at ii9. In the United States, such authorial talent was once thought
to be sufficient to immunize translators from infringement. See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201,
207 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) ("To make a good translation of a work[] often requires more
learning, talent and judgment, than was required to write the original. Many can transfer from one
language to another, but few can translate.").
229 D'Almaine, i6o Eng. Rep. at 121 (recounting the defendant's argument that the owner's pub-
lication was "intended for the higher purposes of music, while that of the defendant [was] adapted
entirely and exclusively for dancing").
230 Id. at 123.
231 Id.
232 For further discussion of the melded aesthetic and economic analysis in D'Almaine, see Anne
Barron, Copyright Law's Musical Work, 15 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 101, 120-22 (2006).
233 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
234 Id. at 473.
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is the melody. That proposition has since been repeated in various ju-
dicial decisions235 and academic commentaries.2 3 6 It's not always obvi-
ous whether the analysis is meant to appeal to the economists, the aes-
theticians, or some combination of the two. But the ease with which
the evaluative move slips between them has allowed decisionmakers to
anchor on melodic overlap even when it's apparent that either the con-
sumers or the critics don't care.237
Yet whoever the proper audience is, the notion that melody always
retains outsized importance is wrong. Across multiple genres, the claim
is a descriptive failure. To begin with, even the European art music that
helped cultivate the claim in the first half of the nineteenth century be-
gan moving away from melodic emphasis in the second.2 38  Since then,
the most memorable contributors to art music often attained that status
for contributing something other than melody. For Wagner and Debussy,
it was harmonies. For Messiaen, it was rhythms and orchestrations.2 3 9
For Schoenberg, it was his dodecaphonic technique, which all but elim-
inated the listener's sense of melodic coherence. Around 1900, European
music theorists began speaking of timbral innovation "liberating" music,
opening up new expressive vistas that were off limits to prior genera-
tions that focused on pitch structures alone.24 0
235 See, e.g., Siskind v. Newton-John, No. 84 Civ. 2634, 1987 WL 11701, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 22,
1987) ("[T]he melody ... is the most important feature of the music. ); Jollie v. Jaques, 13 F.
Cas. 910, 913 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7437).
236 See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 5, at 125 (arguing that melody is "the most conspicuous (to the
lay ear) aspect of a song and is generally the part that makes it 'popular and valuable,' as that
phrase is used in the qualitative measure of the extent of the use" (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Johns & Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F.2d 282, 283 (8th Cir.
1939))); Melody, supra note 2 (describing the judicial treatment of melody as "the single most idio-
syncratic element of the works in question, and almost entirely the locus of the economic worth of
a song").
237 See Boosey v. Empire Music Co., 224 F. 646, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (finding infringement based
on melodic copying even while conceding that the defendant "cannot interfere with the sale of
plaintiffs' composition by virtue of the inherent difference, generally speaking, of the tastes to which
they appeal" and that "the case is not one where plaintiffs' commercial exploitation of their compo-
sition is interfered with"); Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 876 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.) (finding infringement based
on melodic copying despite denigrating the works-in-suit as "the lowest grades of the musical art,"
typical of "numberless songs, all of the same general character" that "each bear strong resemblance
to each other" and "have a monotonous similarity, which only adds to the general degradation of
the style of music which they represent"), aff'd, 183 F. 107 (2d Cir. 1910).
238 Joanna Demers, Melody, Theft, and High Culture, in MODERNISM AND COPYRIGHT 114,
129 (Paul K. Saint-Amour ed., 2011) (describing the collective shift away from distinctive and mem-
orable melodies in the second half of the nineteenth century).
239 In 1936, Messiaen would urge others to take up the banner of rhythmic innovation: "More
rhythms made monotonous by their squareness? We want to breathe freely! Let us . . . rediscover
sumptuous modality, which generates a warm and vibrant atmosphere in keeping with supple and
sinuous rhythms and free-flowing imagination, unhindered by 'metre."' Stephen Broad, Messiaen
and Cocteau, in OLIVIER MESSIAEN: MUSIC, ART AND LITERATURE I, 6 (Christopher Dingle
& Nigel Simeone eds., 2007).
240 See PAINTER, supra note 71, at 85-86.
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Jazz, too, frequently displaces stable melodies from the center of the
work. Much of the value in jazz songs lies in improvisation.2 4 1 Indeed,
some recordings now recognized as classics do rather little in terms of
tune. Take Duke Ellington's "Mood Indigo," one of his best-known
works. It begins with an unusual chorale, full of chromatic harmonies
and scored for a trio of trombone, trumpet, and bass clarinet.242 It then
moves into a second section with a more discernible melody.2 4 3 That
melody is neither especially interesting nor, as it happens, written by
Ellington.2 4 4 His contribution, what gave the piece its lasting appeal,
was the harmony, orchestration, and structural placement of the cho-
rale.2 4 5 Many second comers have performed and riffed on the piece
since its 1931 composition, standard stuff in jazz performance practice.
Ellington's arrangement, however, remains indelibly his. As David
Horn explains:
Countless other musicians [who] have performed their own versions of his
1931 melody Mood Indigo . . . have done so in the tried and trusted jazz
manner of using, and placing their stamp on, whatever available material
was found appealing. Put another way, they have added their voices to the
ongoing, many-voiced dialogue with the piece. But the moment they at-
tempt to reproduce the unusual voicings which gave the first performances
and recordings of Mood Indigo their particular character, they enter into an
entirely different relationship, one that recognizes - and, often, reveres -
the presence of the author.24 6
Electronic dance music, which drives a worldwide market recently
valued at nearly $7 billion, 2 47 likewise discounts melody in favor of sonic
241 See Arewa, supra note 47, at 531-32.
242 See Bjdrn Heile, Who Wrote Duke Ellington's Music? Authorship and Collective Creativity
in "Mood Indigo," in CONCEPTS OF MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT How MUSIC PERCEIVES IT-
SELF AND How COPYRIGHT PERCEIVES MUSIC 123, 131 & n.9, 134 (Andreas Rahmatian ed.,
2015).
243 See id. at 135 ("[Ellington] base[d] the entire composition on its harmonic progression, so that
the tune [in the second section] would appear like a solo chorus or one of a sequence of varia-
tions. . . . [The] basic [harmonic] progression is embellished by a rich and sophisticated chromati-
cism, which lends the piece its languid and sensuous quality and which is almost entirely lacking
in the tune itself."); David Horn, Some Thoughts on the Work in Popular Music, in THE MUSICAL
WORK: REALITY OR INVENTION? 14, 23 n.5 (Michael Talbot ed., 2000) ("[I1t seems unlikely that
Mood Indigo would have acquired its status by virtue of its melody alone.").
244 See Heile, supra note 242, at 129-30.
245 Id. at 136-37 ("The astonishing arrangement and harmony of this section clearly reveal
Ellington as the composer, even if [another] did contribute the melodic line . . . . In terms of an
aesthetic judgment of originality, these aspects arguably outweigh the 'ownership' of any of the
melodies employed.").
246 Horn, supra note 243, at 22-23.





textures. The sound often matters more than the notes.2 48 Drum pat-
terns are more salient than pitch sequences.24 9 As one music critic ob-
serves, what strikes some classically trained musicians as the genre's
"obvious and trite"250 melody lines is in fact a deliberate aesthetic choice
favoring "a device to display timbre, texture, tone-colour, chromat-
ics. . . . Complicated melodies would distract from the sheer lustrous
materiality of sound-in-itself; the pigment is more important than the
line." 2 5 1
Of course, Tempo Music notwithstanding,252 much music-copyright
litigation involves pop songs, from Tin Pan Alley to today's top forty.
Pop's emphasis on memorable hooks might lead one to conclude, as the
Fourth Circuit did in Copeland v. Bieber2 5 3 that infringement analysis
can reasonably rest on those hooks alone.25 4 Yet those singable tunes are
only a single piece of a much larger puzzle in modern songwriting. Gone
are the Brill Building days in which one could package a melody with
lyrics and call it a commercially viable song.2 5 5 The music one hears on
mainstream radio today is instead produced through an assembly-line
process that concentrates first on the production of the underlying beats
and harmonies - melody is frequently the last thing to be ironed out.2 5 6
"Often," one journalist observed after several years interviewing top pro-
ducers and songwriters in the industry, "producers are not looking for a
single melody to carry the song, but rather just enough melody to flesh
out the production."2 57
Measured by either authorial focus or commercial importance, pro-
duction matters as much as the melodies that are ultimately appended
to it. The sonic scaffolding produced in the studio is an essential com-
ponent of the resulting work. 2 58  For much music today, it no longer
248 See, e.g., SIMON REYNOLDS, BRING THE NOISE: 20 YEARS OF WRITING ABOUT HIP
ROCK AND HIP HOP 314-15 (American ed. 2011).
249 Id. at 315.
250 Id. at 314.
251 Id. at 314-15.
252 See supra pp. 1887-88 (discussing Tempo Music's holding that harmony is an independently
copyrightable musical element).
253 789 F.3 d 484 (4 th Cir. 2015).
254 See id. at 494 (holding that a reasonable jury could find two works substantially similar based
solely on their hooks because, "[a]s the part of a song that is most often repeated and remembered,
a chorus hook is important not only aesthetically but also commercially, where it may be central to
a song's economic success").
255 SEABROOK, supra note 55, at 200. Country music is probably the contemporary genre with
the closest resemblance to this history. Id.
256 See id. at 201.
257 Id.; see also Cronin, supra note 49, at 1225 ("The widespread adoption of electronic recording
and the dependence upon synthesized sounds led to ... [a] subtle shift away from the preeminence
of melody among the basic musical parameters of popular songs.").
258 See, e.g., Brauneis, supra note 5o, at 27-28 (arguing that rock music began erasing the line
between performance and composition in the 1950s); Richard Middleton, Work-in-(g) Practice:
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makes sense to think of the composition as a "type," of which a recording
is a particular token. To put it another way, "[tihe production is the
song."259
Judicial gerrymandering of all musical works into compositional el-
ements in the center and performative elements on the periphery is thus
anachronistic and unconvincing. The timbre of synthesized beats is not,
as has been argued, analogous to the color of the wall. 2 6 0 It's more like
the color of a painting.2 6 1
B. The Closing of the Musical Frontier
Even one who accepts that melody is no longer singularly important
might still insist that it remains singularly original. Some court decisions
have suggested that all the good harmonies and rhythms have already
been taken.262 The gist is that musical language is more tightly con-
strained by the marketplace (or, in the Second Circuit's parlance, "the
infantile demands of the popular ear")26 3 and that the frontier has closed
on viable new expression - except in the domain of melody. Outside
of avant-garde cases on the extreme margin, musical innovation would,
on this account, inevitably reduce to melodic innovation.
Yet this theory, too, has serious flaws. At the outset, it can't account
for the studio's production-based creativity discussed above. If, as I
have argued, that creativity is in many cases part of the musical work,
then it immediately takes a place next to (and perhaps even ahead of)
melody as a fruitful source of original material. The theory also can't
account for why, unlike in other areas of copyright law, an original ar-
rangement of individually unoriginal elements must remain unpro-
tected.2 64 Even assuming that melody is the only independent musical
element in which creativity can still frequently subsist, there's not an
Configurations of the Popular Music Intertext, in MUSICAL WORK: REALITY OR INVENTION?
59, 6o (Michael Talbot ed., 2000) (discussing the various trends in popular music that "amount[] to
a thorough blurring (or non-recognition) of the boundary between 'performance' and 'composi-
tion"'); Cronin, supra note 49, at 1214 (discussing the effect of digital recording technologies on
production elements that occupy an increasing percentage of recordings' economic value, to the
point where "more original expression could be found, typically, in the visual and audio recordings
of a performance of a song than in the underlying musical work").
259 Andrew Marantz, The Teen-age Hitmaker from Westchester County, NEW YORKER (Aug. 19,
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/mike-sabath-the-teen-age-hitmaker-from-
westchester-county [https://perma.cc/SPP8-EMAE].
260 See Cronin, supra note 49, at 1227-28.
261 Cf Stephen Davies, Perceiving Melodies and Perceiving Musical Colors, I REV. PHIL. &
PSYCHOL. 19, 29-32 (2010).
262 See, e.g., N. Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
263 Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d Cir. 1940) (per curiam); see also, e.g.,
Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d io6i, io68 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that the court was "mindful of the
limited number of notes and chords available to composers and the resulting fact that common
themes frequently appear in various compositions, especially in popular music").
264 See supra pp. 1884-86.
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obvious doctrinal reason why copying a combination of other elements
wouldn't trigger liability.
It's also not clear that the remaining stock of original melodies is
really so much larger than that of other elements of musical vocabulary.
Indeed, precisely the opposite claim has been made in the past. Melo-
dies, it was once said, had been used up, leaving composers to find mu-
sical originality some other place.2 65  Even in the nineteenth century,
one could find hand-wringing that one generation of composers was left
to fight over its predecessors' melodic scraps.2 6 6 The current character-
ization of melody as the last bastion of creativity may simply be a myth.
The universe of original and marketable pitch sequences is not obvi-
ously bigger than the universe of original and marketable soundscapes
in which those sequences can be contextualized.
C. The Experience of Similarity
A third possibility focuses on the audience rather than the composer.
Copyright's infringement test requires factfinders to stand in the shoes
of a lay listener.267 Perhaps the average lay listener experiences musical
similarity most keenly when hearing a shared melody.2 68 If so, this
might explain why infringement determinations would gravitate in that
direction.
The available data, however, suggest otherwise. A series of con-
trolled experiments involving mock jurors who were asked to decide an
actually litigated music copyright dispute found that their assessments
265 See, e.g., SHAFTER, supra note 46, at 197 ("Since it is generally agreed that the original fund
of melodic ideas has been exhausted, serious composers, and others, have turned to the two other
important elements of music - harmony and rhythm."); Orth, supra note 112, at 234 (arguing that,
given the various physical and economic constraints on music composition, "the claim has under-
standably been made that a melody can no longer be original" and that "[s]ince most if not all
melodies hark back to old times, serious composers trike out in fields of harmony or rhythm (or
lack of it)").
266 See TRIPPETT, supra note 66, at 130 (quoting Wagner's conjecture that young composers
"avoid melodies, for fear of having perhaps stolen them from someone else").
267 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).
268 See, e.g., Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 877 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.) (concluding that infringement exists
"only when the similarity is substantially a copy, so that to the ear of the average person the two
melodies sound to be the same"), aff'd, 183 F. 107 (2d Cir. igi); Jollie v. Jaques, 13 F. Cas. go, 913
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7437); D'Almaine v. Boosey (1835) i6o Eng. Rep. 117, 123 (Ex.) ("[T]he
mere adaptation of the air, either by changing it to a dance or by transferring it from one instrument
to another, does not, even to common apprehensions, alter the original subject. The ear tells you
that it is the same."); Raphael Metzger, Name that Tune: A Proposalfor an Intrinsic Test of Musical
Plagiarism, 5 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 61, 77 (1985) ("Because the aural impressions of the average
person constitute the basis of the audience test, melody figures most prominently in this test. By
emphasizing the importance of melody, Hand's 'comparative method' therefore functions much as
an enhanced audience test."); Sherman, supra note 5, at 125 (arguing that melody is the center of
infringement suits because it "is the most conspicuous (to the lay ear) aspect of a song").
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were strongly influenced by changes in tempo, key signature, orchestra-
tion, and the overall style of performance.269 Varying the sound from
slow R&B to calypso or big band jazz made participants less likely to
perceive substantial similarity, even though the melody remained iden-
tical across conditions.27 0
Though surprising within the world of copyright, this experimental
data shouldn't be too remarkable once one steps outside of it. For all
the uproar over "Blurred Lines," some have had an easier time hearing
its gestalt similarity to "Got to Give It Up" than they have hearing the
similarity between works that share only a melodic hook.27 1 If copyright
privileges melody, then the result is going to be backward.
When pop songs blur together, it's often because of similar produc-
tions, not necessarily similar melodies. When they distinguish them-
selves, it's often a distinctive production at work.27 2  Melody often
doesn't do anywhere near as much of the lay listener's heavy lifting as
copyright traditionally assumes, whether that listener is making a pur-
chase decision or casting a vote in the jury room.
III. MELODY LINES AS BOUNDARY LINES
Thus far, I've argued that systematically giving thicker protection to
a work's melody than to the rest of it can't be justified on the doctrinal
bases traditionally offered for doing so. It's not that melody is neces-
sarily more qualitatively substantial than other aspects of music. It's
not that melody is necessarily more original than other aspects of music.
And it's not that melody is necessarily more of a stand-alone ID badge
269 Lund, supra note 48, at 153, 175; see also Carys Craig & Guillaume Laroche, Out of Tune:
Why Copyright Law Needs Music Lessons, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE 2 IST CEN-
TURY: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES 43, 58 (B. Courtney Doagoo et al. eds., 2014) (report-
ing cognitive psychologists' findings supporting the conclusion that "[o]ur ears are biologically hard-
wired to believe two violin melodies are more alike than two melodies for two different
instruments").
270 See Lund, supra note 48, at 147, 164-66.
271 See, e.g., John Hendrickson, Why Marvin Gaye's Family Will Probably Lose the "Blurred
Lines" Case to Robin Thicke, ESQUIRE (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.esquire.com/entertainment/
music/a33459/blurred-lines-case/ [https://perma.cc/T29D-YMTL] (commenting, after two other
works from different genres ignited a copyright controversy over a shared melodic hook, that
"'Blurred Lines' sounds a lot more like 'Got to Give It Up"'"[t]o the naked ear" even with different
melodies than the other works did to each other); cf Jon Caramanica, What's Wrong With the
"Blurred Lines" Copyright Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. II, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2GlqDoq [https://
perma.cc/KV2Y-Q53P] (arguing that other recent appropriations of artists' signature sounds are "a
more meaningful sort of infringement" than the one in the "Blurred Lines" case and yet aren't
reachable by copyright).
272 See Horn, supra note 243, at 25 (observing that when a listener recognizes a familiar track on
the radio, she "may be responding to melody or rhythm or vocal timbre, or to any combination of
these and other parameters, but the first - and, in all probability, last - point of recognition is the




for the work than other aspects of music. The growing number of in-
fringement cases that have incorporated a more multidimensional con-
ception of copyright's musical object - the ones that cause panic about
chilling effects and music-industry ambulance chasers273 - are at least
being honest. The notion that melody today is the primary locus of
music's value, however defined, is a fiction.
It is, however, a useful fiction. Emphasizing melody is the right ap-
proach, but for reasons different than the ones that legal decisionmakers
have historically given. The best justification for that emphasis isn't
that it faithfully applies underlying infringement doctrine. It is, rather,
that it represents a different vision of what infringement doctrine could
be. By sticking to a single element even as other subject matter has had
to keep track of multiple ones, music copyright could offer relative sim-
plicity.27 4 It historically clung to a definition of creativity that effec-
tively, though not intentionally, sacrificed descriptive accuracy for sheer
administrability.
Elsewhere within the intellectual-property system, courts give that
tradeoff more attention. Patent law has long struggled with how to op-
timize it. By statute, applicants are required to conclude their submis-
sions "with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor re-
gards as the invention."27 5 Those claims are intended to put the world
on notice of the range of embodiments covered by the patent.27 6 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of that notice
function for downstream creators.27 7  Putting the stakes in concrete
terms, one Federal Circuit judge has cautioned that:
273 See Mandell, supra note 24.
274 See, e.g., Demers, supra note 21 (observing that, before the "Blurred Lines" verdict, "most
musicians, lawyers, and industry observers thought that the laws . . . were clear").
275 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
276 See, e.g., McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) ("The object of the patent law in
requiring the patentee to [specifically claim his invention or discovery] is not only to secure to him
all to which he is entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still open to them."); Hoganas AB v.
Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 951 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (observing that patent claims are meant to
"put[] competitors on notice of the scope of the claimed invention").
277 See, e.g., Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2130 (2014) (explaining
that imprecise patent claims "foster the innovation-discouraging 'zone of uncertainty' against which
this Court has warned" (citation omitted)); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002) ("If competitors cannot be certain about a patent's extent, they may be
deterred from engaging in legitimate manufactures outside its limits . . . ."); United Carbon Co. v.
Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942) ("A zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experi-
mentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would discourage invention only a little
less than unequivocal foreclosure of the field."); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304
U.S. 364, 369 (1938) ("The limits of a patent must be known for ... the encouragement of the in-
ventive genius of others .... "); see also Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful
Arts, 74 IND. L. 759, 775 (i999) ("A competitor, whether designing around or improving upon the
claimed invention, must have confidence in where exactly the patentee built his fence so that he
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Patent counselors should be able to advise their clients, with some confi-
dence, whether to proceed with a product or process of a particular kind.
The consequences of advice that turns out to be incorrect can be devastat-
ing, and the costs of uncertainty - unjustified caution or the devotion of
vast resources to the sterile enterprise of litigation - can be similarly
destructive .278
At the same time, courts recognize that sometimes "language in the
patent claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe
with complete precision the range of its novelty." 279 They have therefore
developed the doctrine of equivalents, which secures to the patentee
"those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting the
original patent claim but which could be created through trivial
changes."28 0 That doctrine blurs boundary lines, abandoning some of
the predictability that the claiming system is meant to provide, and so
the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have devoted a great deal of
energy to trying to get the balance right.281
Of course, to spend much time with patents is to know that this sys-
tem has its own flaws, 28 2 and I am not here to defend them. But patent
policymakers at least identify downstream predictability as a social good
that is sometimes worth the loss of some incremental scope in the rights
holder's coverage. For my purposes here, the point isn't that the patent
system has successfully gotten its house in order. The point is that it's
trying.
Copyright law, by contrast, long ago threw up its hands and declared
such optimization a fool's errand. The modern substantial-similarity
test bends over backward to try to guess what a lay observer would find
qualitatively important in a work. Because every work is different,
courts proceed case by case and are incapable of generating guidance at
can proceed accordingly and position himself to avoid the potential sting of a plausible infringement
allegation." (footnote omitted)).
278 Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Bryson, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
279 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 731.
280 Id. at 733.
281 See id. at 731-32 (describing the various limitations on the doctrine, intended to preserve "the
delicate balance . . . between inventors, who rely on the promise of the law to bring the invention
forth, and the public, which should be encouraged to pursue innovations, creations, and new ideas
beyond the inventor's exclusive rights," id. at 731); see also, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S.
605, 607-08 (1950); Johnson & Johnson Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam).
282 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744-47 (2009) (noting the difficulties of precisely mapping
words to things and suggesting that courts pay less attention to claim terms and more attention to
the written description of the invention).
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even high levels of generality.28 3 This inscrutability has been a familiar
complaint for decades. In 1967, Professor Benjamin Kaplan confessed
that "[w]e are in a viscid quandary once we admit that 'expression' can
consist of anything not close aboard the particular collocation in its se-
quential order."28 4 Little has changed since. In 2016, the test was still
described as "a virtual black hole in copyright jurisprudence."28 5
Judges simply shrug it off. From the doctrine's beginnings, courts
embraced its vagueness as an unfortunate but unavoidable fact of legal
life. 28 6 One early commentator explained:
No fixed rule can be given for determining what amount of copied or bor-
rowed matter is essential to constitute infringement; or, in other words, how
small may be the quantity taken, and still amount to piracy . . . The deter-
mination of this question of fact is often one of extreme difficulty, and the
finding will vary with the circumstances in each case, and with the judg-
ment of the person or persons whose duty it may be to ascertain the fact.
The ratio which the part bears to the whole from which it is taken will
often be a material consideration; but it is obvious that no relative or frac-
tional part of either production in controversy can be fixed as a standard
measure of materiality. An amount material in one case will be unimportant
in another.28 7
Many have tried to make peace with this black box. As Judge
Easterbrook put it, "[a]fter 200 years of wrestling with copyright ques-
tions, it is unlikely that courts will come up with the answer any time
soon, if indeed there is 'an' answer, which we doubt."28 8 The most that
anyone is willing to say is that excessive similarity "occupies a non-
283 See, e.g., Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Sub-
stantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 722-23 (1987) ("[Substantial similarity] is a phrase
that, instead of becoming more understood with each judicial interpretation, has become more am-
biguous."); David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 5o B.C. L. REV. 139, 158 (2009) ("If I
want to create a sound recording but am not sure whether it will infringe the copyright of some
other sound recording author, I simply have to create my work of authorship and then wait to see
if litigation ensues."); Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, go VA. L. REV. 465,
500 (2004) (noting that for copyrights, more so than for patents, "[o]bservers bear the costs of deter-
mining what constitutes the protected expression," often through litigation); Rebecca Tushnet,
Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 716-17 (2012) ("The
substantial similarity test is notoriously confusing and confused, perplexing students and courts
alike.").
284 BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 48 (1967).
285 Balganesh, supra note 113, at 794.
286 See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) ("We have to
decide how much, and while we are as aware as any one that the line, where-ever it is drawn, will
seem arbitrary, that is no excuse for not drawing it. . . ."); Bramwell v. Halcomb (1836) 40 Eng.
Rep. iiio, 111o (Ch.) ("When it comes to a question of quantity, it must be very vague.... It is not
only quantity but value that is always looked to. It is useless to refer to any particular cases as to
quantity.").
287 DRONE, supra note 2og, at 413.
288 Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990).
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quantifiable value on the legal spectrum between no similarity and iden-
ticalness,"28 9 but where on the spectrum is anyone's guess. The leading
copyright treatise today counsels that substantial similarity "presents
one of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one that is the
least susceptible of helpful generalizations."290 These comments are par
for the course in the copyright world: caution the practitioner that sub-
stantial similarity is difficult, warn against trying to induce an analytical
framework from existing precedent, and move on.
But what if downstream creators seeking to avoid infringement
knew to concentrate on a particular expressive element within the copy-
righted work? The work as a whole would still get a thin layer of pro-
tection against wholesale or nearly wholesale copying. Only one part of
it, however, would get thicker protection against even fragmentary cop-
ying under a substantial-similarity analysis. Such a system, transpar-
ently weighing in favor of a single element, would make copyright more
certain at the margins in signaling the work's boundaries.
Roughly speaking, that's the system of music copyright that the
twentieth century grew up with. The great attention paid to melody
effectively focused second comers on Kaplan's elusive "particular collo-
cation" even in cases of nonliteral copying.291 Musical works did not
have written claims, but as a practical matter they bore sign posts for
where to tread most cautiously.
Melody makes a good focal point for two reasons. First and most
importantly, it's modular.292 For the majority of nonliteral infringement
cases likely to pass through the judiciary's gates, one could spot a mel-
ody and then carve it away from the rest of the work. Second, once
melody has been identified, it is relatively easy to notate as a quantifia-
ble, isolated element. Notes, at least in Western music, are discrete var-
iables. They can be counted.293
These two qualities make melody a better focal point than other mu-
sical elements. Assessing the strength of two works' melodic similarity
requires far less sophistication than assessing the strength of two works'
289 BUC Int'l Corp. v. Int'l Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d 1129, 1148 (I1th Cir. 2007).
290 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03.
291 See KAPLAN, supra note 284. Indeed, practically anticipating Kaplan's remark, Judge Hand
defined the musical work as the melody's "collocation of notes." Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 877
(C.C.S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 183 F. 107 (2d Cir. igi).
292 My use of the modularity concept draws from Professor Henry Smith's work in property law.
See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. i69i (2012); Henry E.
Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J.
1742 (2007). I thank Professor Oren Bracha for suggesting this terminology.
293 But cf Jerome Frank, Say It with Music, 61 HARV. L. REV. 921, 929 (1948) (describing a
purely "gestaltist" position that "a melody does not result from the summation of its parts; thus to
analyze a melody is to destroy it"). I concede that anyone who sees musical analysis as a destructive
force isn't likely to welcome my proposal. I find it telling, though, that even Judge Frank's Platonic
gestaltist has no problem removing melody from the musical context in which it originates.
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timbral or structural similarity.2 9 4 Plenty of legal decisionmakers aren't
fluent in musical terminology, of course, but even they probably under-
stand what it means to say that two phrases have a certain number of
notes in common. Even rhythm, which can at least be quantified more
easily, turns out not to be nearly as perceptible across different musical
settings .295
Not every expressive element in copyrightable subject matter lends
itself to such dissection. Try, for instance, quantifying how much of a
theatrical narrative has been copied. In one of copyright's canonical
infringement cases, Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,2 9 6 an enterpris-
ing expert witness claimed to do just that. The witness attempted to
reduce any dramatic plot to a scientific formula, claiming to perform
infringement analysis with "the same precision and accuracy that I can
identify a person by the prints of his fingers."2 97  Unsurprisingly, the
argument did not go well in court.2 98  Surely, though, every would-be
litigant would love such a formula if it actually offered some predictive
power. In many nonliteral infringement contexts, the sheer quantum of
incommensurable characteristics keeps that formula unattainable.29 9
Music cases offer a better, even if still imperfect, forum for such as-
sessments. Melody's modularity and quantifiability enables second
comers to make a reasonable ex ante guess as to whether they have taken
too much. Copy someone's original melody, the law would counsel, and
you might be in trouble. Copy someone's original rhythm, harmony,
orchestration, or organizational structure, on the other hand, and you're
on far safer ground. Make no mistake, these guesses will always carry
risk, since limiting the inquiry to a particular element still doesn't spec-
ify how much of that element may be copied. How many notes is too
many will still vary from context to context.3 00 But the unidimensional
294 For one of the several possible ways of doing this, see Adam Berenzweig et al., A Large-Scale
Evaluation ofAcoustic and Subjective Music-Similarity Measures, COMPUTER MUSIC J., Summer
2004, at 63, 63-76. In short, it's complicated.
295 See Henkjan Honing, Structure and Interpretation of Rhythm in Music, in THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF MUSIC 369, 383 (Diana Deutsch ed., 3 d ed. 2013) (surveying cognitive studies finding that
"[w]hen a melody is transposed to a different register, . . . it is ... perceived as the same melody,"
but other studies finding that listeners fail to make the same connection between rhythmic patterns
when the tempo is changed).
296 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
297 MARK ROSE, AUTHORS IN COURT SCENES FROM THE THEATER OF COPYRIGHT 101
(2016). Bizarrely, that expert witness just also happened to be the plaintiff's attorney. See id. at
101-02; Jessica Litman, Silent Similarity, 14 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. L. 11, 36 (2015).
298 Litman, supra note 297, at 36.
299 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 782 (2009)
("There are so many characteristics that one might reasonably discern from the exemplar of any
particular copyrightable work, which is why substantial-similarity judgments are unpredictable.").
300 For this reason, a melody-centered infringement framework doesn't necessarily conflict with
the Ninth Circuit's admonition that courts measuring substantial similarity must not "simply com-
pare the numerical representations of pitch sequences and the visual representations of notes to
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framework is at least better than the alternative of trying to weigh the
importance of multiple, interrelated dimensions simultaneously. Even
if these boundaries will never be predictable with certainty (nothing con-
cerning intellectual-property scope is), music cases could at least lower
the margin for error by keeping other variables out of the equation.
Recall the statement of the Westminster Abbey organist from this
Article's introduction.3 0 1 When he defended a melody-centered infringe-
ment test, it was on account of neither romantic genius nor consumer
preferences but the need for "a rough and ready rule which may not be
perfect in its application to all cases, but . . . is intelligible and clear."3 0 2
As a policy matter, that argument has always been the best one. There
just hasn't been much need to make it until recently. In the United
States, there wasn't any urgency to press the point because the perceived
supremacy of melodic expression accomplished the same thing. But as
the judicial conception of musical creativity expands, that privilege re-
cedes, leaving behind a newly broadened copyright scope. The better
we understand how audiences value musical works, the fuzzier the
whole copyright enterprise becomes.3 0 3  The problem is that existing
doctrine doesn't provide the necessary tools to regain the clarity that is
lost.
What might such a tool look like? After conducting an intriguing if
unwitting test of focusing on melody for so long, music copyright offers
one possible answer. In effect, the law chose a single, easily identifiable
facet of the work and then let second comers organize their creative
activities around that choice. That facet was also likely substantial
enough to insulate owners against market-destructive piracy - not the
exclusive guarantor of commercial success that judges historically as-
sumed it was, but at least enough to get the job done in most cases. To
be sure, this legal regime precommitted a decisionmaker to excluding
contextual color from case to case. The lack of flexibility inevitably
increased the error rate of identifying the qualitatively important parts
of a work. But combined with thin protection against literal, complete
copies, a melody-centered substantial-similarity doctrine delivered to
copyright owners a reasonable degree of protection and to second com-
ers a decent sense (relative to alternative nonliteral infringement re-
gimes) of what the ground rules were.
determine that two [musical segments] are not substantially similar, without regard to other ele-
ments of the compositions." Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 847-48 (9th Cir. 2004).
301 See supra p. 1868.
302 Austin v. Columbia Graphophone Co. [1923] MacG. Cop. Cas. 398, 406-07 (Ch.) (Eng.).
303 The district court in the Blurred Lines case acknowledged that fuzziness in denying attorneys'
fees to the Gaye estate. See Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 13-cv-o6oo4, 2016 WL 6822309,
at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2016) ("This case presented novel issues. How they would be determined
was not, even with hindsight, something that was clear."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Williams v. Gaye, Nos. 15-5688o, 16-55089, 16-55626, 2018 WL 1403577 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2018).
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The test is underinclusive, yet the resulting comfort with the rules of
the game is likely worth the bargain. So long as the system continues
to recognize nonmelodic material as copyrightable expression, the cost
of giving weaker protection to that material is likely minimal.3 0 4  In
most potential copyright disputes over music, a thin layer of protection
covering literal copying of any original expression plus a thick layer of
protection covering even nonliteral copying of melodies in particular
should be sufficient to maintain the economic incentive to create.
There are probably some cases where that level of protection
wouldn't be sufficient. But their existence wouldn't justify a broader,
more opaque standard unless their aggregate value outweighs the re-
sulting costs to creative production in the long term. And when one
considers the probable benefits of a clearer, unidimensional inquiry, that
possibility appears remote. To begin with, clarity reduces the number
of cases that require litigation to resolve.3 0 5  Consider, for example, the
compulsory license for creating cover songs, the one statutory emphasis
on melody in the current Copyright Act.3 0 6 That provision has yielded
virtually no litigation over the extent of creative adaptation permitted
to the licensee.3 07  Privileging melody as the common thread between
original and cover keeps it that way.3 08
While this decrease in litigation costs is the most obvious benefit of
a unidimensional test, in hindsight one can identify another: a generative
payoff for second comers. Fighting a copyright dispute is expensive;
losing a copyright dispute even more so.309 A publisher or record label,
which bears high investment costs upfront but captures only a fraction
of a potentially infringing use's ocial value, has every incentive to avoid
those legal gray areas that might delay or scuttle a project.3 1 0
304 If, on the other hand, nonmelodic musical expression were ineligible for a copyright altogether,
the impact would be more severe. Cowriters who contributed something other than the notes would
be denied any copyright interest, and melodyless compositions would be entirely unprotected from
widescale reproduction. To be clear, my proposal is not to deny authorship status to composers of
such expression, but only to restrict the scope of the rights that they receive.
3os See Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 319, 329-33 (2013) (discussing false positives that result from uncertain boundaries in infringe-
ment disputes).
306 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2012).
307 For an exceedingly rare exception, see TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. DM Records, Inc., No. 05 Civ.
5602, 2007 WL 2851218, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007).
30s See Rebecca Tushnet, Performance Anxiety: Copyright Embodied and Disembodied, 6o J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 209, 247 (2013) ("If performance elements were part of the musical
work, then the statutory license for covers could become much more complicated.... [Section
115(a)(2)] reflects specific Western norms about what musical works are, but it also gives cover
artists greater certainty about what they can do.").
309 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 890-91 (2007).
310 Id. at 891; Depoorter & Walker, supra note 305, at 325.
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When the relevant restriction is clear, by contrast, the firm can de-
sign around it. Indeed, a law intended to promote creativity may raise
some special considerations in sorting through the familiar rules-versus-
standards debate.3 11 I have argued elsewhere that creators are often
well equipped to think outside the boxes that existing copyright entitle-
ments erect for them.3 12 But they still need to know where those boxes
end and begin.3 1 3
The birth of bebop in the 1940s provides a case study in how draw-
ing clear IP lines can direct creativity in unanticipated new directions.
Jazz composers had by that time developed elaborate improvisatory
techniques in their songs, often layered on top of familiar Tin Pan Alley
tunes.3 14 The problem was that, by repeating those tunes, the composers
were excluded from copyright authorship. Not only did they lose out
on earning royalty revenue themselves, but also their record labels had
to pay the compulsory license fee to the tunes' owners.3 1 5 The predica-
ment was the product of a legal system that undervalued the artistic
contributions of these musicians, predominantly African American, in
favor of those who operated within the old European model focusing on
melody.3 16
That restriction, even if oblivious to the genre's aesthetic priorities,
was at least clear. So the composers created around it. They developed
original melodies to overlay on top of iconic - but, according to copy-
right, unprotectable - chord changes.3 17 The result was the cultivation
of an influential musical idiom that would later be dubbed the contra-
fact.3 18 The most famous examples were hundreds of variations on the
harmonic progression to George Gershwin's "I Got Rhythm," popularly
coined "rhythm changes," though there were many others.3 1 9 The con-
trafact took on artistic importance not because of its melody, as the legal
system presumed, but because of the particular interplay it nurtured
between old and new.3 2 0 These were not obvious examples of musicians
311 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985).
312 See generally Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2015).
313 See id. at 1385-88.
314 See Osteen, supra note 2, at 96-97; Horn, supra note 243, at 26-2 7.
315 Osteen, supra note 2, at 97-98.
316 See Arewa, supra note 47, at 483-86.
317 The result would likely have been different under an infringement regime like that contem-
plated by the district court in Tempo Music, but that decision wouldn't arrive until 1993.
318 See James Patrick, Charlie Parker and Harmonic Sources of Bebop Composition: Thoughts
on the Repertory of New Jazz in the 1940s, J. JAZZ STUD., June 1975, at 3, 5-6.
319 See Osteen, supra note 2, at 89; Note, Jazz Has Got Copyright Law and that Ain't Good, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1940, 1948-49 (2005). For an extensive but still nonexhaustive list of contrafacts,
see List of Jazz Contrafacts, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Listof-jazzcontrafacts
[https://perma.cc/RGT2-ESBA].
320 Osteen, supra note 2, at 97, 104-05.
2018] IglI11
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
relying on authorless sctnes dfaire.3 2 1 In bebop's infancy, these harmo-
nies came from a known source - indeed, much of the point of rhythm
changes was a conscious homage to Gershwin. If copyright law had
formally attributed harmonies to an author as easily as it did melodies,
contrafacts likely would not have been commercially possible.
The history of contrafacts is an example of how copyright policy
choices can influence not just the level but also the direction of artistic
investment. That influence may seem like a significant cost of trying to
clear up infringement doctrine's persistent vaguenesses. But it isn't. To
understand the potential objection, and why it ultimately fails, one
needs to consider the complicated relationship between copyright and
product quality.
One possible danger of imposing ex ante rules in defining infringe-
ment is that any under- or overinclusivity would divert the trajectory of
creators' activities.3 2 2 In fashion, for example, designers cling to the few
buoys of intellectual-property protection in an industry where most ex-
pression isn't copyright eligible.3 23 It's one reason why firms may focus
on innovating textile patterns and physically separable ornaments,
which are protectable, rather than the cut of a garment, which isn't.3 24
321 Cf supra note 182.
322 See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 47, § 1.14.2-3 (arguing that if protection for uses associated
with a particular audience is decreased, "incentives to produce works tailored to the tastes of that
audience will decline or disappear," and theorizing that the first-sale exemption for DVD copies
may prompt film producers to "invest less than they otherwise would in producing motion pictures
aimed at audiences that avoid movie theaters in favor of watching rented videocassettes and DVDs
at home"); Jonathan M. Barnett, Is Intellectual Property Trivial?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1733
(2009) ("[T]he distributive outcomes generated by stronger or weaker levels of intellectual property
may indirectly exert incentive effects with respect to the direction (or quality) of innovation invest-
ment, even if they exert no incentive effect with respect to the rate (or quantity) of innovation
investment."); Kate Darling, IP Without IP? A Study of the Online Adult Entertainment Industry,
17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 714 (2014) (finding that, due to enforcement difficulties, the adult
entertainment industry has shifted away from selling access to fixed content and is "increasingly
moving into convenience and experience goods, which are inherently difficult to pirate"); William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325,
331-32 ('989) ("[It is easy to note particular distortions that a copyright law corrects. Without
copyright protection, . . . [t]here would be increased incentives to create faddish, ephemeral, and
otherwise transitory works because the gains from being first in the market for such works would
be likely to exceed the losses from absence of copyright protection."). In the patent literature, con-
cerns over distortion are even more pronounced. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The
Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1942-50 (2013) (arguing
that patent protection can have distortive effects, stemming from asymmetries between different
types of informational goods and the structural features of exclusion rights).
323 See C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 6i STAN.
L. REV. 1147, 1176-78 (2009).
324 Id. at I178 n. iI6. Professors Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk Gersen also note that the avail-
ability of trademark protection in the fashion industry leads some established firms to plaster their
wares with marks, which form a bulwark against copying in the absence of effective copyright
protection. Id. at 1177.
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In stand-up comedy, the growth of plagiarism-style norms against ap-
propriation helped shift resources away from developing original meth-
ods of delivery, which are naturally hard to copy, and toward developing
original texts, which had been easily copyable until those norms started
dissuading the copyists. 3 2 5 More or less protection doesn't just mean
more or less stuff gets made. It can also mean that whatever stuff does
get made is going to look or sound different.326
If that's so, my proposal may seem troublesome. It appears to inter-
fere in the musicmaking of both the upstream composers seeking copy-
right protection and the downstream composers seeking to avoid in-
fringement. On the upstream side, once composers (or the legally
sophisticated publishers with whom they work) know that melody car-
ries enhanced copyright protection, they should rationally focus more on
writing unappropriable tunes than on other, easily appropriable forms
of musical expression. One could quibble with the assumption that in-
dividual creators are so sensitive to these shifts in protection of frag-
ments that they'd significantly alter their songs - at least so long as
they're receiving protection against verbatim copying of the entire work.
But there's probably at least some marginal effect. Downstream, where
avoiding infringement is a real concern,3 27 there's likely to be an even
larger effect. Composers may worry more about differentiating melo-
dies than about differentiating other aspects of their compositions.3 28
Society would then miss out on whatever material they would have
come up with if law had not tilted the playing field.
That's not necessarily a losing trade, however. It seems clear enough
that most of us want a continuing supply of new works (even though we
now have more music than any of us could listen to in a lifetime). Copy-
right sensibly tries to facilitate that supply. Yet what that music should
sound like is not something traditional copyright theory is equipped to
predict.329 If a disproportionate legal emphasis on melody leads com-
posers to spend more creative labor writing melodies, as an economic-
325 See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence
of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787,
1857-58 (2008).
326 See id. (calling for greater recognition that copyright laws "may change the nature of the
creative practices they are regulating, that different people are likely to create and consume at
different levels of protection, and that different content is likely to be conducted under different
production processes").
327 See generally Gibson, supra note 309.
328 For an example of this selective caution playing out through social norms, see Montgomery,
supra note 56.
329 See, e.g., Jessica Silbey, Aaron Perzanowski & Marketa Trimble, Afterword: Conferring About
the Conference, 52 Hous. L. REV. 679, 681 (2014) (comments of Professor Aaron Perzanowski)
("Copyright's goals remain rather amorphous. We expect the copyright system to result in more
creativity, to produce stuff. But beyond that, copyright policy has avoided considerations of what
kind of stuff, produced by whom, and for whom."). But see Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information
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incentives model would predict, the welfare effects are opaque. Perhaps
some will shift serious resources toward tunesmithing. Perhaps some
others will write melodies merely as a box to check off while continuing
to invest compositional energy elsewhere, as the architects of jazz con-
trafacts did. Perhaps some musical work that would have been made
under a more multidimensional infringement regime now does not get
made, and a different musical work gets made in its place. Which path
would make society best off?
One may be tempted to ask the market, letting price signals identify
the most valuable expression. That, at least, is what classical copyright
doctrine envisions.3 3 0 One could debate whether present consumer pref-
erence is the right way to measure value in this context.3 3 1 But even if
it is, the market may not tell us. Even on welfarism's own preference-
satisfaction terms, the market for expressive works is often beset by herd
behavior and information cascades that cloud its signals with a great
deal of noise.3 3 2 One telling experiment found that listeners' music rat-
ings were strongly influenced by perceptions of others' music ratings;
the average consumer's evaluation depended on what he or she thought
other consumers thought.33 3  Consumption choices can be referenda on
the power of social influence as much as on artistic value.3 3 4
Perhaps there's something about law dirtying its hands in the eleva-
tion or demotion of particular expressive elements that lends the result-
ing products a veneer of inauthenticity. Yet to call that effect inauthen-
tic is to assume a baseline of "pure" cultural production that has never
Theory of Copyright Law, 64 EMORY L. 71 (2 014) (arguing that information theory can help an-
swer the question of what kinds of works the copyright system should promote).
330 See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903) (concluding that
granting exclusivity over expressive works would promote progress "if they command the interest
of any public" and thus "have a commercial value"); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,
410 F.3d 792, 801-02 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a de minimis exception for sound recordings because
even a small snippet "is something of value," id. at 802, that the defendants would otherwise not
have "intentionally sampled," id.); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 620-21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)
(No. 4436) ("[Wlhether to be better or worse is not a material inquiry in this case. If worse, his work
will not be used by the community at large; if better, it is very likely to be so used. But either way,
he is entitled to his copy-right, 'valere quantum valere potest' [let it be worth as much as it is
worth]." Id. at 621.). For more on copyright doctrine's deference to the market for assessing aes-
thetic worth, see Barton Beebe, Bleistein, the Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making of
American Copyright Law, I17 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 372-73 (2017).
331 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 888 (2o01) (positing a distinction between
great works and popular works).
332 See Fishman, supra note 312, at 1374 (describing the herd behavior and information cascades
in markets for cultural goods, rendering market signals poor indicators of those goods' innate quality).
333 Matthew J. Salganik et al., Experimental Study of Inequality and Unpredictability in an Ar-
tificial Cultural Market, 311 SCIENCE 854, 855-56 (2006).
334 Id. at 856 ("[W]hen individual decisions are subject to social influence, markets do not simply
aggregate pre-existing individual preferences.").
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really existed.3 3 5  Creativity is always contingent on the external envi-
ronment, whether it's technology,3 3 6 funding, '3 3 a physical ailment,338 or
even the weather.3 3 9 Law is simply part of the mix. The length of pop
songs, for example, is likely affected by how copyright law calculates
mechanical royalties.3 4 0 Contrafacts as a genre likewise came into ex-
istence because of copyright's asymmetrical protection of different mu-
sical elements. Trading completeness for predictability led to the pro-
duction of new music that was obviously dependent on law, but not
obviously poorer than what would otherwise have been produced. Law-
induced redirection, in itself and without more, is normatively neu-
tral - neither benefit nor cost. That music, or any art form, shifts with
the legal winds does not ipso facto make it less valuable as a work of
authorship.
Let me be clear: I am not making the absolute claim that every redi-
rection of creative investment is impervious to welfarist criticism. Along
certain vectors, where the divergence from audience preference is easier
to identify, such criticism might be fully warranted. For example, rely-
ing on funding mechanisms that cater to decisionmakers other than
the ultimate consumer may yield goods that the consumer genuinely
deems inferior. The asymmetry between advertiser and consumer pref-
erences is the well-known knock on traditional network television,
whose advertiser-driven content favors tolerableness for the many at the
expense of passionate allegiance for the few. 3 41 According to some, this
asymmetry is also the reason why the perceived renaissance in television
programming today is predominantly supported by subscription-based
33 See Michael Madison, Blurred Copyright Lines, MADISONIAN (Mar. 16, 2015), http://
madisonian.net/2015/03/16/blurred-copyright-lines/ [https://perma.cc/ZAg6-Z7N3] (noting the imag-
inary baseline).
336 See, e.g., Sean M. O'Connor, Patented Electric Guitar Pickups and the Creation of Modern
Music Genres, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1007 (2016).
337 See, e.g., Clive James, Hit Men, NEW YORKER, July 7, 1997, at 70, 72.
338 See, e.g., Paper Cut Outs (Gouaches Ddcoupis), HENRI MATISSE, http://www.henri-matisse.
net/cut outs.html [https://perma.cc/2DNG-NGCD].
39 See KRISTI MCKIM, CINEMA AS WEATHER: STYLISTIC SCREENS AND ATMOSPHERIC
CHANGE 58-59 (2013).
340 Peter K. Yu, How Copyright Law May Affect Pop Music Without Our Knowing It, 83 UMKC
L. REV. 363, 370-71- (2014).
341 See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 165 (2006) (arguing that
"advertiser-supported media tend to program lowest-common-denominator programs, intended to
capture the eyeballs' of the largest possible number of viewers" who won't switch their TVs off,
rather than to "seek to identify what viewers intensely want to watch"); Simon P. Anderson & Jean
J. Gabszewicz, The Media and Advertising: A Tale of Two-Sided Markets, in ] HANDBOOK OF
THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE 567 (Victor A. Ginsburgh & David Throsby eds., 2006);
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, io6 YALE L.J. 283, 361 (1996).
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channels that try to deliver a product worth paying for.34 2 In that con-
text, at least, there's a theoretically coherent case that a legal interven-
tion biasing firms' monetization strategy for or against advertising dol-
lars will affect product quality. But that effect results from an under-
lying market externality, not from government involvement in itself.
The normative implications of a thumb on the infringement scale in
favor of melody, by contrast, are far more ambiguous. A shift along that
qualitative dimension doesn't obviously defy current demand any more
than it obviously creates new demand.
Thus far, I've focused on allocative concerns. But questions of dis-
tributive justice usually hang over copyright's value judgments, and my
proposal is no exception. One might fairly worry about the distribu-
tional effects of protecting the musical element most favored in certain
cultural traditions but not the ones most favored in others. A melodic
emphasis in music copyright reflects European aesthetic norms that
don't represent much of modern musicmaking, especially within genres
pioneered by black artists. Defining the musical work in terms of mel-
ody has discounted and discriminated against wide swaths of these art-
ists' creativity.3 43
That critique is real. But I'm not convinced that the right response
is to increase the number of musical elements that are fair game in in-
fringement actions. Many of the same marginalized artists whose non-
melodic contributions have been freely available to others have also ben-
efited from others' nonmelodic contributions being freely available to
them. Protection for one, after all, means exclusion for everybody
else.3 4 4 Musical traditions like jazz, blues, and hip-hop rely heavily on
342 See, e.g., ROBERT LEVINE, FREE RIDE: How DIGITAL PARASITES ARE DESTROYING
THE CULTURE BUSINESS, AND HOW THE CULTURE BUSINESS CAN FIGHT BACK 141-42
(2011); Harrison J. Reynolds, Introducing Price Competition at the Box Office, 20 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. I, 24-25 (2013).
343 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Blues Lives: Promise and Perils of Musical Copyright, 27
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 573, 617 (2010) (observing how copyright's embedded hierarchies
have enabled "borrowing that often disadvantage[s] ... African American musicians ... [and that
has] facilitated the development of extractive and at times exploitative patterns with respect to
African American music, particularly prior to the first half of the twentieth century"); Olufunmilayo
B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84
N.C. L. REV. 547, 625-28 (2006) (discussing courts' impoverished conceptions of rhythmic and har-
monic originality in hip-hop); Sean O'Connor et al., Opinion, Overdue Legal Recognition for
African-American Artists in "Blurred Lines" Copyright Case, SEATTLE TIMES (May 20, 2015, 5:22
PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/overdue-legal-recognition-for-african-american-artists-
in-blurred-lines-copyright-case/ [https://perma.cc/JA3U-3V4Z] ("[A] focus[] on catchy melodies ...
derived from a white, European - often 'high brow' - approach to music . . . [has] marginalized
the influential harmonic and rhythmic innovations of artists of color from jazz on through rock and
hip-hop.").
344 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELES-
TIAL JUKEBOX 4 (Stanford Univ. Press, rev. ed. 2003) (1994) ("[W]hen copyright gives control to
one person, it extracts some measure of freedom to imitate from everyone else."). For an argument
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musical borrowing that copyright's basic machinery has had trouble
processing. Even with only melody protected, that borrowing has been
costly. If distributive fairness is the goal, it's far from clear that making
the borrowing still costlier would help those who have historically re-
ceived the smallest slices of the pie.
That copyright selectively withheld protection for certain spaces
within a musical work may have even helped cultivate certain stylistic
idioms within communities of black artists. In this vein, Professor Keith
Aoki has argued that "[w]hile it may seem unfortunate or unjust that
certain musical genres remained legally unprotected . . . the lack of
copyright protection for un-notated musical scores during this [late
nineteenth-century] period was a factor in the astonishing fecundity of
black creative musical invention."3 4 5 Certainly the development of jazz
contrafacts would have been much harder under a regime in which har-
monic copying was regulated as strictly as melodic copying.
The sword of appropriation has more than one edge. While copy-
right's singular protection of melody exposed artists of color to unat-
tributed and uncompensated copying of nonmelodic innovation, it si-
multaneously supplied a relatively cheap tool to reduce the resulting in-
equality. As jazz drummer Max Roach recounted, the copyright regime
enabled black musicians to acquire compositional capital that they could
then convert into commercial assets:
If you're gonna think up a melody, you'd just as well copyright it as a new
tune, and that's what we did. We never did get any suits from publishers.
... [W]hen we got downtown, people wanted to hear something they
were familiar with, like "How High the Moon," "What Is This Thing Called
Love?" Can you play that? So in playing these things, the black musicians
recognized that the royalties were going back to these people, like ASCAP,
the Jerome Kerns, the Gershwins. So one revolutionary thing that hap-
pened, they began to write parodies on the harmonic structures. Which was
really revolutionary. If I have to play it, I will put my own particular mel-
ody on that progression, and people would ask, "Say, what is that?"
And we would say, "Well, you asked for 'What Is This Thing Called
Love?' and that's what it is." . . . If you made a record, you could say, "This
is an original." 3 4 6
that, for most of history at least, underadvantaged creators had the better of the bargain because
copyright included enough exceptions to allow them to incorporate existing expressive materials at
minimal to no cost while also including enough protection to attract funding for their creative proj-
ects, see Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1535,
1546 (2005).
345 Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special
Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 760 (2007).




Taking the distributive concern on its own terms, I remain skeptical
that elevating all original elements of a musical work to melody's his-
torical status would present a cure better than the disease. Achieving a
copyright system that is sensitive to a wider array of creators is of course
a worthy goal, but decisions like "Blurred Lines" haven't shown us how
to get there.3 47
IV. CODA: BEYOND MUSIC
Legal predictability is relevant to all sorts of creators, of course, not
just composers. It's thus worth considering whether music's old unidi-
mensional approach could be translated into other areas of copyright
law today. While a full treatment of that question is beyond my scope
here, I close by offering a rough approximation of how one might gen-
eralize the music-specific proposal in the preceding Part.
As others have discussed at length, the various creative domains gov-
erned by copyright law differ in important ways, from consumer de-
mographics to production costs to network effects.3 48  One underex-
plored source of heterogeneity is that some art forms are easier to break
down into discrete chunks than others. One could call it the modularity
of expression. Because music falls on the easier side of that range, mel-
ody can frequently be isolated to serve as a touchstone in infringement
cases.
A similar dissection exercise would be more difficult in some other
fields. Likely the least feasible would be visual works. We perceive
pictures differently than we do prose, our brains processing an indivisi-
ble whole rather than a compilation of multiple elements.3 4 9 As Judge
Newman has remarked, "one cannot divide a visual work into neat lay-
ers of abstraction in precisely the same manner one could with a text."3 5 0
Consequently, there aren't particular modules to which downstream cre-
ators trying to avoid infringement could easily restrict their inquiry.
347 Moreover, if copyright were to try to encompass every form of creative authorship, it would
look little like the system we have today. Already that system excludes typeface developers, fashion
designers, chefs, landscapers, and actors, despite the considerable creativity that each of them dis-
plays in their work.
348 See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual
Property Law, 55 Am. U. L. REV. 845, 853-56 (2006).
349 See 3 PATRY, supra note 50, § 9:71 (endorsing a "total-concept-and-feel" test for visual works
because "visual works can rarely be divided into chapters or paragraphs like textual works can and
instead rely on perceptions of the whole to convey meaning"); Tushnet, supra note 283, at 69o-9i
("[B]ecause we process images o quickly and generally, we may stop looking before we realize that
critical thought should be applied to them. Pictures are perceived more as a gestalt, while texts
appear to the reader in a set sequence, most or all of which needs to be processed for the whole to
be understood." (footnote omitted)).
350 Jon 0. Newman, Herbert Tenzer Distinguished Lecture in Intellectual Property, New Lyrics
for an Old Melody: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in the Computer Age, 17 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 6gi, 698 (999).
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A more interesting test case is literary characters. As a thought ex-
periment, imagine if copying a character's name were a necessary
(though not sufficient) condition for infringing the copyright in the char-
acter. Under this hypothetical regime, a new character could share a
background and life story with a copyrighted predecessor, so long as the
name changed. As a practical matter, this is roughly what happened
when E L James wrote fan-fiction derivatives of Stephenie Meyer's pop-
ular Twilight series, only to subsequently swap out the relevant names
and entitle her story Fifty Shades of Grey.351 Whether that change was
sufficient to avoid infringement, as opposed to merely earning the copy-
right owner's blessing, we'll never know. There was no lawsuit. But if
there had been, the name changes may very well have been insufficient
under existing law to defeat an infringement action.3 5 2
If the name were instead an element of substantial similarity be-
tween literary characters, that result likely changes. A case could be
made that the change would be for the better. Like melody in music
(indeed, even more so), one can easily isolate the name as a standalone
feature. Downstream creators could have more certainty over whether
they were going too far. Moreover, copyright owners may not be signif-
icantly threatened. In many contexts, a name change may render the
resulting work a far less viable substitute for the original. Part of char-
acters' enduring appeal is the notion that they live fictional lives, today
part of one story and tomorrow part of a different one.3 5 3 If the defen-
dant's character has a different name, the work isn't trying to present a
new chapter in that life. The copyright owner's markets hould be less
imperiled once the linkage is broken.
How much less imperiled is an empirical question, whose answer
may or may not ultimately support zeroing in on the name. I'm not the
first to float the idea,3 5 4 and my goal isn't to press the case for it conclu-
sively here. My point is only that a narrow test is at least worth explor-
ing in the context of literary characters for the same reasons that make
melody an appropriately narrow test in the context of music.
351 See Marah Eakin, Holy Crow! Fifty Shades of Grey Is Crazy Similar to Its Twilight Origin
Story, A.V. CLUB (Feb. 12, 2015, 3:09 PM), http://www.avclub.com/article/holy-crow-fifty-shades-
grey-crazy-similar-its-twil-21i51-85 [https://perma.cc/Q2J7-NSC5]; Jane Litte, Master of the Universe
Versus Fifty Shades by EL. James Comparison, DEAR AUTHOR (Mar. I, 2012), http://dearauthor.
com/features/industry-news/master-of-the-universe-versus-fifty-shades-by-e-l-james-comparison/
[https://perma.cc/QTgQ-JFMC].
352 See, e.g., Lone Wolf McQuade Assocs. v. CBS Inc., 961 F. Supp. 587, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(holding that a reasonable juror could find infringement based on sufficiently similar character
traits, despite different names).
353 See Zahr K. Said, Fixing Copyright in Characters: Literary Perspectives on a Legal Problem,
35 CARDOZO L. REV. 769, 770-71 (2013) (describing the phenomenon in which "[r]eaders become
deeply attached to 'their' characters," id. at 770).
354 See E. Fulton Brylawski, Protection of Characters - Sam Spade Revisited, 22 BULL. COP-
YRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 77, 96 (1974).
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That some but not all subject matter could be amenable to a nar-
rowly focused infringement inquiry means that copyright law would
need some filtering system. Fortunately, the substantial-similarity
framework itself already equips courts to perform such subject-matter
tailoring. By policing the line demarcating how much nonliteral copying
is too much, courts are in a position to vary the thickness of the owner's
entitlement according to what type of work it is.3 5 5 For some categories,
the optimal thickness may be limited to a single dimension. Music is
one example. Further research may reveal others.
CONCLUSION
Borrowing from an aesthetic norm with roots in nineteenth-century
Europe, U.S. courts historically gave more protection to melody than to
other musical elements because that's what they thought encapsulated
the work. Perhaps that view is still true of certain genres. But it has
long outlived the time when it could claim to be true of the full range of
music created and consumed.
Unsurprisingly, then, the primacy of melody in infringement cases is
weakening. That is a good thing for descriptive accuracy. But it is a
troubling thing for musicmaking. Music copyright shouldn't privilege
melody because that's what musical value or originality is always about
(it's not). It shouldn't privilege melody because that's how listeners al-
ways cognize similarity (they don't). It should privilege melody, rather,
because it helps downstream creators better understand what's allowed.
The American experience with music copyright over the last century
offers a glimpse at what a substantial-similarity regime might look like
if it favored transparency over thoroughness.3 5 6 As a matter of doctrinal
first principles, the recently expanded definition of the musical work is
correct. But given the results, those principles may be misfiring.
3 See Balganesh, supra note 2og, at 231-33.
356 Cf Tushnet, supra note 308, at 248 (arguing for manageability rather than recognition of cre-
ativity to guide the decision of whether performers can be authors under the Copyright Act).
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APPENDIX
According to a famous (and oft-misattributed) aphorism, "writing
about music is like dancing about architecture." 3 5  My verbal descrip-
tions of disputed musical works are decidedly not the best evidence for
readers to reach their own conclusions regarding those disputes. While
I can't provide audio clips in the margins of this journal, this appendix
is my attempt at the next best thing. For almost every musical-similarity
case cited, I have provided a link to the corresponding entry in the online
archive of The Music Copyright Infringement Resource. That project,
cosponsored by Columbia Law School and the University of Southern
California Gould School of Law, collects scores and, in many cases,
sound clips of musical works involved in infringement litigation from
the nineteenth century to the present day. I list the name, year of deci-
sion (or, if no decision has yet been issued, then the year of the com-
plaint), and the URL.
Case Name and URL Year
Arnstein v. Porter 1946
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/194o-11949/Pages/arnsteinporter.html
[https://perma.cc/BC6W-9NHW]
Austin v. Columbia Graphophone Co. 1923
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/192o-I[929/Pages/austincolumbia.html
[https://perma.cc/4XQQ-G6CS]
BMS Entertainment/Heat Music LLC v. Bridges 2005
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/2000-2009/Pages/bmsbridges.html
[https://perma.cc/DL4Q-6RGU]
Boosey v. Empire Music Co. 1915
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/i9Io-1i9'19/Pages/booseyempire.html
[https://perma.cc/MLK6-C7SF]
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc. 2009
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/2000-2009/Pages/bridgeportumg.html
[https://perma.cc/SYY9-PAME]
Cooper v. James 1914
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/i9Io- 191 9/Pages/cooperjames.html
[https://perma.cc/KUM3-TNU7]
Copeland v. Bieber 2015
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/2010-20I9/Pages/copelandvbieber.html
[https://perma.cc/9BCZ-G6XD]
Dienel v. Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp. 2016
http://mcir.usc.edu/inplay/Pages/DienelvBieber.html
[https://perma.cc/92FS-H25N]
3 See Writing About Music Is Like Dancing About Architecture, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR,
https://quoteinvestigator.com/201-0/Idi/o8/writing-about-music/ [https://perma.cc/K3DA-3ENP] (last
updated June 20, 2012).
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Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham 1924
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/1920-I929/Pages/fredfisherdillingham.html
[https://perma.cc/8VW7-DT65]
Griffin v. Sheeran 2017
http://mcir.usc.edu/inplay/Pages/GriffinVSheeran.html
[https://perma.cc/FgNJ-ACELI
Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc. 1916
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/i9 1o-191i 9/Pages/haasleofeist.html
[https://perma.cc/62LE-9 MPJI
Hein v. Harris 1910
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/192o-I[929/Pages/heinharris.html
[https://perma.cc/KZW9-YV8R]
Italian Book Co. v. Rossi 1928
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/192O-I[929/Pages/italianbookrossi.html
[https://perma.cc/Q7SB-BSQ5]
Johnson v. Gordon 2005
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/2000-2009/Pages/Jiohnsongordon.html
[https://perma.cc/J3GH-GK46]
Jollie v. Jaques 1850
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/Beforeigoo/Pages/jolliejaques.html
[https://perma.cc/A8QP-YLQJ]
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson 1976
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/I97o-Ii979/Pages/mcawilson.html
[https://perma.cc/4ZQG-8RQ9]
Miller v. Lovato 2016
http://mcir.usc.edu/inplay/Pages/SleighBellsVLovato.html
[https://perma.cc/WP94-Q96D]
Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distributing Co. 1952
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/1950-1959/Pages/northernking.html
[https://perma.cc/Z3XZ-LPYZ]
New Old Music Group, Inc. v. Gottwald 2015
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/2010-20I9/Pages/newoldmusic.html
[https://perma.cc/8TGL-T7EF]
Newton v. Diamond 2004
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/2000-2009/Pages/newtondiamond.html
[https://perma.cc/Q2LP-ES551
Poindexter v. EMI Record Group, Inc. 2012
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/20I0-20I9/Pages/PoindexterEMI.html
[https://perma.cc/E625-5RJD]
Siskind v. Newton-John 1987
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/I98o-I 989/Pages/SiskindNewtonJohn.html
[https://perma.cc/5KTS-SEUU]
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Swirsky v. Carey 2004
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/2000-2009/Pages/swirskycarey.html
[https://perma.cc/PMSJ-XUgE]
Tempo Music, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp. 1993
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/i99o-1i999/Pages/tempofamous.html
[https://perma.cc/2TLB-SN841
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. 1908
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/I9oo- i 909/Pages/whitesmithapollo.html
[https://perma.cc/M6PZ-RQG4]
Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Williams v. Gaye 2015
http://mcir.usc.edu/inplay/Pages/williams.html
[https://perma.cc/KTQ5-FYEX]
Yours, Mine & Ours Music v. Sony Music Entertainment 2016
http://mcir.usc.edu/inplay/Pages/YoursMineVSony.html
[https://perma.cc/7NP4-8EVA]
ZZ Top v. Chrysler Corp. 1999
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/i99o-1i999/Pages/zztopchrysler.html
[https://perma.cc/JsDE-GZMH]
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